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SYNOPSIS 
The pillaging of companies by those who control them is becoming a common 
occurence in South Africa. The problem arises where those in control of a 
company are its sole shareholders and the property they are charged with 
stealing, though not legally belonging to them, is vested in an entity which itself 
belongs to them. One defence is that there can be no theft where the 
company consents to the appropriation of its funds. It is argued that a theft 
is committed only where all the criminal elements of the crime of theft are 
satisfied, notwithstanding the consent, or absence thereof, by the company. 
Case law indicates that a conviction depends on the : solvency or insolvency 
of the company; degree of control and victim of the appropriation. It is 
submitted that it is inappropriate to base a conviction on these criteria. All 
abuses of the corporate structure should be punished. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most firmly established tenets of company law, first recognised in the 
landmark case of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd, , is that the company is a legal 
entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. Separate personality as 
expounded in Salomon, means that companies as separate entities, own their own 
property legally and beneficially, and that however close the degree of control by the 
corporate governance, companies are not by that fact alone agents or trustees of their 
human controllers. 2 The twin principles of incorporation and limited liability have 
been an incalculable boon to western commerce. They are also privileges, a means 
of avoiding personal liabilities which would otherwise arise, and as such the doors for 
abuse are wide open. 3 Kahn-Freund 4 described Salomon as •a calamitous 
decision", but the case has been consistently followed and remains the custodian of 
a bedrock principle of both English 5 and South African company law. The "calamity" 
lies in the ease with which persons who are essentially the proprietors of their 
businesses can put a wall between themselves and their creditors, a consideration 
which argues that the criminal law should treat company property as "property 
1 [1897} A C 22. 
2Even a controlling shareholder may not deal with the assets of the company as if they were his own, see ,S 
v De Jager 1965 {2) SA 616 (A); In re George Newman & Co {1895] 1 Ch 674; E B M Co Ltd v Dominion Bank 
[1937} 3 AllER 555 {PC); In re Cleadon Trust Ltd [1939] Ch 286 at 311; [1938] 4 AllER 518 (C A) per Scott L J; 
In re H R Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62; [ 1958] 3 AllER 689. 
3M Whincup • 'Inequitable Incorporation'. the Abuse of a Privilege• (1981) 2 Co Law 158. 
40 Kahn-Freund "Some Reflections on Company Law Reform• (1943) 7 MLR 54 at 56. 
5L C B Gower Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law 5 ed (1992) 86 (hereafter Gower). 
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belonging to another• for the purposes of the crime of theft - even against those who 
have a 100 percent stake in the company. a 
With no minimum capital requirements for either close corporations, private or public 
companies, limited liability is freely available with a minimum of formality 7 and at 
modest cost. Unless there are special circumstances, persons with financial claims 
against a company must look exclusively to its funds. Therefore, in the interests of 
creditors and company employees, all company funds should be used exclusively in 
the pursuit and fulfilment of the trading objects of the company and not dissipated by 
self interested payments to company controllers. Civil law constraints on company 
controllers in this regard a are insufficient by themselves in preventing and remedying 
the abstraction of corporate funds. The criminal law has an appropriate role in 
inhibiting such conduct and in many cases the most suitable offence to charge will be 
theft. 9 
There are legitimate means by which a corporate controller can take funds out of a 
company. These include: 
lawfully declared dividends out of profits; 
legitimate and reasonable salaries; 
6G R Sullivan •Company Controllers, Company Cheques and Theft" [1983] Crim L R 512 at 517. 
7Companies Act 61 of 1973 ss 32-73; Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 ss 2, 12, 13 and r15. 
8Discussed infra under V(D) Fraud on the Creditors. 
9G R Sullivan op cit note 6 at 513. 
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repayments of loan accounts; 
reasonable reimbursement; 
redemption of redeemable preference shares; 
reduction of capital in compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act 10; 
borrowing from the company and reflecting the director or shareholder as a 
debtor. 
It is not these legitimate means which are the concern of this contribution, but rather 
the unlawful appropriation of company funds and property. 
To establish theft from a company should in certain instances not create difficulties. 
If a burglar had to break into the company offices and appropriate money from the 
company safe, he would most certainly be charged and convicted of theft from the 
company. Ukewise, if the managing director had to take RSOO,OO (five hundred rand) 
out of the petty cash drawer to go gambling, this would also amount to theft. Clearly 
the members of a company may be guilty of stealing from the company. This is so, 
even though the members in question are officials of such importance that for some 
purposes they "represent the directing mind and will of the company and control what 
it does,· with the effect that for those purposes, "the state of mind of these managers 
is the state of mind of the company, and is treated by the law as such: 11 
1061 of 1973 ("the Act"). 
11H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 Q B 159 at 172, per Denning L J. 
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In larger companies, an abstraction of company monies may perhaps not take the 
form of a straightforward appropriation. It may be accomplished by the abuse of 
arrangements for loans to directors 12, options to purchase company houses 13, 
executive share incentive schemes 14, inter-corporate trading between connected 
companies 15 or •golden handshakes• 16• In instances like these, where there is a 
facade of legitimacy, the prosecution may find it difficult to establish the ingredients 
of theft. If the executive is both devious and careful, he will be vigilant enough to 
note the arrangement in the company books and make disclosure to shareholders 17• 
But non-disclosure to shareholders in breach of statutory obligations is a frequent 
concomitant of such transactions. Even in quoted public companies, the chief 
executive may tire of such subtleties and simply treat the company money as his own. 18 
Such directness will be typical in the smaller, closely controlled company or close 
corporation, where appropriations will take the form of direct dealings with company 
money either causing the company to draw cheques in favour of company controllers 
121nvestiqation into the Affairs of Court Une Ltd, HMSO (1982), pars 151 - 161, taken from G R Sullivan op cit 
note 6 at 513. 
131nvestigation into the Affairs of Lonrho Ltd, HMSO (1976), para 9.53 taken from G R Sullivan idem at 513. 
14Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, ex parte Gov. of Singapore (1980) 70 Cr App R 77. 
151nvestigation into the Affairs of Pergamon Press Ltd,HMSO (1973), pars 1244- 1250 taken from G R Sullivan 
op cit note 6 at 513. 
16Re Ace (1982) 3 Co Law 196. 
17 A relevant question is whether it would amount to theft where the board of directors at a properly constituted 
meeting were to resolve intra vires to dispose of the company property in a certain way. If the managing director 
were to put the resolution into execution, he would be disposing of the company property in the manner authorised 
by the company. Therefore it seems that one would enquire whether the disposition of property is one that is 
properly authorised by the company. Superlicially it would appear that if it is so authorised, the disposition cannot 
be theft, if it is not, it may be theft. This contention is addressed in this article. 
181nvestigation into the affairs of Peachey Propertv Corporation Ltd HMSO (1979), sXIII, taken from G R Sullivan 
op cit note 6 at 514. 
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or by such controllers drawing excessive remuneration. 19 
The core issue of this article is whether a person in control of a limited liability 
company, by reason of shareholding and directorship, or two such persons acting in 
concert, can and should be convicted of stealing the property of the company. The 
argument which has found favour in certain of the authorities runs as follows. There 
can be no theft if the owner consents to what is done 20• If the accused, by reason 
of being the controlling shareholder or otherwise, is "the directing mind and will of the 
company· he is to be treated as having validly consented on behalf of the company 
to his own appropriation of the company's property. This is apparently so whether 
or not there has been compliance with the formal requirements of company law 
applicable to dealings with the property of a company and even to cases where the 
consent relied on is ultra vires 21 • 
This approach has been criticised as being wrong in law 22• Where a company is 
accused of a crime, the acts and intentions of those who are the directing minds and 
will of the company are to be attributed to the company. That is not the law where 
the charge is that those who are the directing minds and will have themselves 
19Re George Newman ltd [1895]1 Ch 674; Re Duomatic [1969] 2 Ch 365; Mainwaring (1982) 74 Cr App R 99 
concern the controllers of private companies and the haphazard manner in which company money may be treated 
by them. 
20R v Morris [1983] 3 AU ER 288; R v Jona 1961 (2) SA 301 f'N). 
21 R v Raffel [1985] VR 511; R v McHugh (1988) 88 Cr App R 385. See R v Gomez [1993] 1 All ER 1 at 40. See, 
however, S v De Jager supra note 2 dissenting judgment of Rumpff J A at 617-8. 
22R v Gomez idem per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 40. 
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committed a crime against the company 23• This argument states that the whole 
question of consent by the company is irrelevant. Whether or not those controlling 
the company consented or purported to consent to the abstraction of the company's 
property by the accused, he will have appropriated the property of the company. The 
question in this argument will be whether the other necessary elements of the crime 
of theft are present 24• Both arguments will be canvassed in this paper. 
This contribution will examine the concept of corporate control; the essential elements 
of the crime of theft in our law; comparative studies in Australia, New Zealand and 
England on the topic of whether the taking of monies and credit facilities by controllers 
of closely held companies would amount to theft; the application of criminal principles 
to absolutely controlled companies, and will also consider the difficult policy issue of 
whether it is correct to convict defendants who are in absolute control of companies 
for abstracting property from their companies. 25 
II CORPORATE CONTROL 
The term •corporate controller• covers a wide spectrum which stems from the concept 
of control - the ultimate power in the policy-making hierarchy of the corporation. 
Corporate control is a function of the ownership of voting stock. It is exercised by the 
process of casting votes and consists of the power to choose directors. As a 
23See Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] 2 All ER 216, [1984] QB 624 applying Belmont 
Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 118, [1979] Ch 250. 
24R v Gomez supra note 21 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 40. 
25See also G Virgo "Stealing from the Small Family Business• [1991] Cambridge L J 464. 
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corollary, it carries the capacity to influence and possibly to dominate the board of 
directors. 26 Bayne 27 states that control is chameleon-like, skipping from place 
to place in the corporate venture. Although control might be thought to reside most 
properly in the shareholder-owners, in times of financial pressure, it may shift to the 
bondholders or the preferred shareholders 28• Mere ownership of shares need not 
mean control. Control is the power over the shares by whomever owned, or 
dominion over the owner of the shares. Effective control, as distinguished from the 
absolute ownership of more than 50 percent of the stock, may be held by 
management founded on mere incumbency and maintained by access to the 
corporate mechanics of proxy solicitation, personnel and funds. 
In South Africa, the legislature has crystallised the control function in section 440 A (1) 
of the Act 29• "Control" is defined to mean the holding of shares or other securities 
in a company entitling the holders thereof to exercise the specified percentage or more 
of the voting rights at meetings of that company, irrespective of whether such holding 
gives de facto control or not 30• The "specified percentage• 31 , which must not be 
26A A Berle • 'Control' in Corporate Law (1958) 58 Columbia l R 1212. 
270 C Bayne "A Philosophy of Corporate Control" (1963) 112 University of Pensvtivania l R 22. 
280 C Bayne idem at 30. 
29Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
30See the definition of ·control" ins 440A (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
31 See the definition of "specified percentage• in s 440A (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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less than 20 percent, is prescribed in the Code 32 and is presently 30 percent 33• 
Serle 34puts forward two distinct types of control in the corporate system : absolute 
or outright control and working control 35• ·Absolute control" exists when : 
(a) there is only one shareholder in the company 38, ,aking nickname• as it was 
put in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 37; 
(b) the majority of voting stock in a company is held by a single owner or by a few 
stockholders and their nominees, who by agreement or tacit consent act 
together; 
(c) where a very large minority is so held, while ownership of the_ majority is 
disbursed among many small holders. 
51 percent of ownership of the voting shares in a single hand or compact group 
constitutes absolute control. 35 percent ownership may also amount to 
32Securities Regulation Code on Take-overs and Mergers (the "Code"), promulgated in terms of s 440C (3) and 
(4) by A 29 Government Gazette '12962 of 18 January 1991. 
33Section B par 5 of the Code. 
34A A Serle op cit at note 26 at 1213. 
35J Gerson "Corporate Control- the Pivotal Role of the Proprietor" (1992) 2 Optima 38 and G Virgo op cit at 
note 25 at 465 discuss the forms of corporate control as absolute control (companies where all the shares are 
owned by the wrongdoer(s)) and majority control (companies where the wrongdoer(s) only have majority control.) 
J Gerson describes a majority controlled company as a company where an absolute majority of the votes is held 
by a single family, a financial institution, a long term partnership between two families or some other limited, stable 
and identifiable coalition. 
38Ukewise in a dose corporation where the entire members' interest is held by one member. 
37 Supra at note 1. 
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absolute control if the remaining 65 percent is split among hundreds or 
thousands of small shareholders; 
(d) where there·are subsidiary companies which are wholly owned by their holding 
companies. 
Today the normal fact situation is probably more often that of ·working control" rather 
than absolute control resting on direct stock qwnership 38• ·working· control" is 
more complex as it involves the additional element of the capacity to mobilise other 
shareholders. It commonly exists where a shareholder, or small group of 
shareholders, have a substantial minority interest, but also have a readily available 
method of inducing sufficient additional shareholders to vote with them so that in 
combination they can elect directors. Traditionally maintaining working control 
encompasses having so close a relation with the existing board of directors that in any 
corporate election, the board would request proxies for a slate of directors chosen or 
approved by the holders of this substantial minority. Because so many small 
shareholders almost automatically sign and return the proxy requested by the 
management, the ability to direct the proxy machinery, together with a substantial 
minority of ownership, commonly adds up to the ability to choose directors 39• 
A rubric of the control function is •management control• which exists where there is 
no substantial minority and the stock is widely scattered among a large number of 
shareholders. Here the capacity to direct the proxy machinery is all that is 
38A ABerle op cit at note 26 at 1213. 
391dem. 
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necessary 40• 
Ill THE ELEMENTS OF THEFT 
In South Africa the crime of theft is not statutorily defined. Snyman "1 describes the 
constituent elements of the common law crime of theft as : 
"the unlawful and intentional appropriation of anothers movable corporeal property, 
or of such property belonging to the perpetrator himself, but in respect of which 
somebody else has a particular right of possession. • 42 
If a person in absolute control of a company is charged with theft from that company, 
four requirements must be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, before he is convicted. 
They are (a) an act, which is performed in respect of, (b) a particular type of property 
(c) unlawfully and (d) intentionally 43• 
401t is conceivable that a minority group may be able to mobilize additional shareholders votes without reference 
to the proxy machinery of the corporation itself. This is what is done when there is a proxy fight and a group 
wanting to change management undertakes the task of mobilizing the majority. But this is expensive, difficult and 
is not a common occurrence. 
41 C R Snyman Criminal law 2 ed 1991 (hereafter C R Snyman) 467. 
42The following definition put forward in Gardiner and Lansdown 2 1652 has been accepted as correct in various 
decisions, such as R v Von Elling 1945 AD 234 236; R v Harlow 1955 (3) SA 259 (T} 263; R v Sibiya 1955 (4) SA 
247 (A) 250-251 and S v Kotze 1965 (1) SA 118 (A): "Theft is committed when a person, fraudulently and without 
claim of right made in good faith, takes or converts to his use anything capable of being stolen, with intent to 
deprive the owner thereof of his ownership or any person having any special property or interest therein of such 
property or interest." Snyman points out that this definition is unacceptable, becausa it was for all practical 
purposes taken over over from s1 of the English larceny Act of 1916 (which has been replaced in England by the 
Theft Act of 1968). Necessary requirements such as unlawfulness and intention are not mentioned, or are clothed 
in unacceptable, outdated and vague expressions such as "fraudulently" and "without claim of right made in good 
faith." P M A Hunt, South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol11 2 ed (1990) (hereafter PM A Hunt) defines 
theft as the "unlawful contrectatio with intent to steal of a thing capable of being stolen•. For other short definitions 
of theft seeR v Viljoen 1939 OPD 52 56; R v Jona supra at note 20 at 316 G; S v De Jager supra at note 2 at 617. 
43C R Snyman op cit at note 41 at 468. 
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A AN ACT OF APPROPRIATION (contrectatio) 
Few areas of the criminal law present as much difficulty as contrectatio 44, which was 
the term used in Roman and Roman-Dutch law to describe the act of theft. Originally 
contrectatio meant the handling or touching of a thing, although today it is clear that 
a thing can be stolen without necessarily being touched or physically handled, for 
example the theft of money 45• Contrectatio usually means any conduct by which 
an accused acquires effective control over property and simultaneously deprives the 
owner or lawful possessor of his control over it 46• 
Snyman states that as it is desirable to describe the requirements for crimes in terms 
coherent to the layman, and seeing that the term contrectatio has lost its original 
meaning 47, the best way of describing the act required for theft is to refer to it as an 
appropriation of the property. Although our common law authorities may not have 
used the term ·appropriation·, it describes precisely what our courts in practice 
understand by the act of stealing or the term contrectatio 46• 
44P M A Hunt op cit at note 42 at 601. 
451dem at 472. 
46C R Snyman op cit at note 41 at 472. Contrectatio was described as the acquisition or exercise of control 
in R v Brand 1960 (3) SA 637 (A) 641 C. E; S v Albasini 1967 (4) SA 605 (R A) 607 H; R v Mkwanazi 1960 (2) S 
A 248 (N) 251 F. This criterion is also apparent from those decisions dealing with the dividing line between theft 
and attempted theft, where it is obviously necessary to decide whether there was a completed contrectatio. 
47 C R Snyman op cit at note 41 at 473. The concept of appropriation is used to desctibe the act of theft in 
England in the Theft Act 1968; Victoria, Australia in the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). This concept is also applied in the 
definition of theft in s 206 (1) of the American Model Penal Code. J C De Wet sharply critizes the concept of 
contrectatio in (1950) 13 THRHR 243. 
480ur courts aften describe theft as an "appropriation·, although Snyman states that their use of the word 
"appropriation• is somewhat vague. See R v Viljoen supra at note 42 at 56; A·G [vi) v Martens 1960 (1) S A 120 
(A) 124 C-D; R v Jona supra at note 20 at 316 G; S v Luther 1962 {3) SA 506 (A) 511 C; S v De Jager supra 
at note 2 at 617 : "A short (and incomplete) definition of theft is the unlawful appropriation of somebody else's 
property"; S v Van Coller 1970 (1) SA 417 (A) 425. 
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Appropriation means any act in respect of property which amounts to the accused 
behaving as if he were the owner of the property, and by which the owner or lawful 
possessor is effectively precluded from exercising his rights over his property. Actual 
deprivation is required 49• 
In the case of the theft of money and funds which are commonly manipulated by 
means of cheques, negotiable instruments, debit or credit entries in books or 
registration in the electronic "memory• of a computer, such transactions may constitute 
a sufficient assumption of control to amount to an appropriation. Here we speak of 
the unlawful appropriation of "credit", •economic assets" or "an abstract sum of money" 
and what is important is the economic effect of the accused's conduct 50• 
For an absolute controller to be convicted of theft, an appropriation of company assets 
must be established. Although appropriation is the central element of the offence 
of theft, in neither R v Jona 51 nor S v De Jager 52, the two seminal South African 
theft cases covering this topic, did the court even address the issue of appropriation 
53
, instead concentrating on the issue of corporate consent. It is respectfully 
49C R Snyman op cit at note 41 at 473. 
501dem at 485. 
51 Supra at note 20. 
52Supra at note 2. 
53Foreign case law can be used to elucidate the appropriation requirement. Under English law the term 
"appropriation• is statutorily defined. By section 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968; 
• Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, 
and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without 
stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as 
owner". 
In the context of the Theft Act, appropriation conveys the idea of treating something as if it were one's own. 
According to s 3(1) ·~ assumption by a personof the rights of an owner" amounts to an appropriation. In light 
of this definition what is meant by appropriation is at the very heart of any discussion as to whether theft can be 
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submitted that the courts did not take cognisance of the weight of the criminal 
elements of the crime of theft in the corporate context. 
B PROPERTY CAPABLE OF BEING STOLEN 
proven. 
Although our common law authorities refer only to theft of movable corporeal property 
in commercia, our courts have long recognised that when money is stolen by the 
manipulation of cheques, banking accounts, funds, false entries and so on, it amounts 
to the theft of incorporeals 54• 
The difficulty in English law concerned the conflict between two decisions of the House of Lords giving rise to much 
debate in subsequent cases and academic writings. In Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1971]2 
All EA 1253, [1972] AC 626 the House of Lords had laid down unequivocally that an act may amount to an 
appropriation notwithstanding that it is done with the consent of the owner. On the other hand, in A v Morris 
[1983]3 All ER 288. [1984] AC 320, Lord Roskill had stated that the concept of appropriation involved an act not 
expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner, but an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those 
rights. 
The Morris approach was specifically adopted and applied in the English case of McHugh and Tringham (1989) 88 
Cr App R 385; the majority judgment in the Australian case of A v Roffe! (1985) 3 ACLC 339 (Supreme Court of 
Victoria) and the New Zealand case of Craig v Minister of Police (1983) BCR 141. Lawrence was followed and 
approved in the English cases of R v Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290, CA; Dobson v General Accident Fire and 
Life Assurance Corp pic [1989]3 AllER 927 and the minority judgment in Roffe! (supra). To settle this long standing 
debate, the point of law which finally came to be decided by the House of Lords in the recent case of R v Gomez 
[1993] 1 All ER 1 was: 
"When theft is alleged and that which is alleged to be stolen passes to the defendant with the 
consent of the owner, but that consent has been obtained by a false representation, has, (a) an 
appropriation within the meaning of s 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 taken place, or (b) must such a 
passing of property necessarily involve an element of adverse [interference] with or usurpation of 
some right of the owner?" 
In applying Lawrence and disapproving the dictum of Lord Roskill in Morris the Law Lords held (Lord Lowry 
dissenting) that a person could be guilty of theft, contrary to s 1 (1) of the 1968 Act, by dishonestly appropriating 
, goods belonging to another if the owner of the goods was induced by fraud, deception or a false representation 
to consent to or authorise the taking of the goods, since it was the actual taking of the goods, whether with or 
without the consent of the owner, in circumstances where it was intended to assume the rights of the owner that 
amounted to the 'appropriation' and the fraud, deception or false representation practised on the owner made the 
appropriation dishonest. Thus it is now clear that under British law there can be an appropriation whether or not 
the owner consents to the taking. 
54C R Snyman op cit note 41 at 476. 
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For property to be capable of being stolen, it must either belong to another or belong 
to the perpetrator himself, but in respect of which somebody else has a particular right 
of possession 55• Applying the Salomon principle, a corporation has a separate 
legal personality and exists apart from its members 56• The money and credit 
facilities of the company constitute the property of the company. Where a director 
takes company money for his own use, he may be convicted of stealing from the 
company r;r. It makes no difference if the defendant is a shareholder with absolute 
control of the COrf1pany, because shareholders do not have a proprietary interest in 
corporate property 58• 
The only way that the property of the company could ever be said to belong to a 
shareholder is if the corporate veil can be pierced or lifted 59• It appears that this 
will only be allowed where the company is a •mere facade concealing the true 
facts" 60• Examples of this include where the company has only been established 
as a means to defraud creditors or to evade the obligations imposed by law, or where 
55Refer to the definition of theft idem. 
58Salomon principle applied in Goodall v Hoogendoorn 1926 AD 11 at 16; Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal 
Council1920 AD 530; Estate Salzmann v Van Rooyen 1944 OPD 1; Gumede v Bandhla Vukani Bakithi Ltd 1950 
(4) S A 560 (N); Lategan N 0 v Boyes 1980 (4) S A 191 (T) 200. This principle was affirmed in the United 
Kingdom by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries pic [1990] Ch 433, 536 and the House of lords, J H 
Rayner (Mincing Lane} Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 433, 482 (Lord Templeman), 515 (lord 
Oliver). 
57R v Kohn (1979) 69 Cr App R 395; R v Mainwaring (1981) 74 Cr App R 99 and R v McHugh and Tringham 
(1989) 88 Cr App R 385. 
581n Macaura v Northern Assurance [1925] AC 619, 633 Lord Wrenbury stated : 
"The corporator even if he holds all the shares is not the corporation, and ... neither 
he nor any creditor of the company has any property legal or equitable in the assets 
of the corporation. • 
See further J T Pretorius (editor), P A Delport, M Havenga and M Vermaas Hahlo's South African Company law 
through the cases: A Source Book 5 ed (1991) (hereafter H R Hahlo) 20- 21. 
5£1See H S Cilliers, M l Benade, J J Henning, J J DuPlessis and P A Delport Corporate Law 2 ed {1992) 9-
12 {hereafter H S Cilliers); l C B Gower op cit note 5 at 108- 138. 
60Lord Keith of Kinkel, Woolfson v Strathc!yde Regional Council (1979) 38 P & C R 521, 525. 
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the company for all intents and purposes acts as the agent for the shareholder 61 • 
The basis for the decision in Salomon and pertinent to this paper is that where there 
is only one shareholder with absolute control, that fact alone does not necessarily 
make that company a facade. Ukewise, "wholly owned subsidiaries· can exist as 
commercial entities independent of their holding company. 
C WRONGFULNESS 
The wrongfulness of an appropriation may be excluded by a ground of justification, 
for example consent 62• In theory, an accused is not guilty of theft if he takes 
property with the consent of the owner or person entitled : the taking must be invito 
domino 83• The consent may however be legally ineffectual due to non-compliance 
with statutory or common law requirements for consent. The latter possibility has 
been raised in two cases 64 in which company directors were charged with theft of 
company funds. 
Whether a corporate controller can authorise his own disposition of company property, 
and thus negative the wrongfulness requirement, was first addressed by the South 
African courts in R v Jona 65, where it was held that a sole beneficial shareholder and 
61 More than effectual and constant control is required before the company is treated as the shareholders' agent, 
other factors such as to whom the profits belong and who governs the trading venture are to be taken into account : 
Smith, Stone and Knights ltd v City of Birmingham [1939] 4 All E R 116 (KB). 
62Corporate consent to company abstractions will be discussed below. 
83R v Herholdt 1957 (3) SA 236 (A) at 257; R v Jona supra note 20 at 317; S v De Jager supra note 2 at 617, 
624-5. 
64R v Jona idem, S v De Jager idem. 
65Supra note 20. 
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director of a private company who had abstracted various amounts from the 
company's funds for his own purposes, was not guilty of theft. There were two 
reasons for the acquittal. The one was that there was a reasonable possibility that 
the accused bona fide believed that he had the right to take the money in the 
circumstances, especially as he was the sole beneficial shareholder and director. The 
other ground for his acquittal was that in law there could be no theft because the 
owner of the abstracted funds was the company, and that company, acting through 
its sole beneficial shareholder and director, the accused, had consented to the 
abstractions. In this connection, Williamson J said that in this particular case, the 
company, as represented by the whole of its directorate (all the directors being 
Dr Jona himself) and all of its shareholders (all of the shareholders being Dr Jona 
himself) had consented to Dr Jona taking the money out of the company. As it was·~ 
not a taking without the consent of the owner, there could be no intention to steal. 
The learned judge stated that when the owner consents to property being taken, it is 
never theft, unless it is misrepresented to him in some way and he has given his 
consent through a misapprehension 66• 
A similar matter was brought before the Appellate Division in S v De Jager and 
another 67• De Jager, who practiced as an attorney for nine years, was charged with 
theft by abstracting various sums of money from a public company of which he was 
a director. The trial court found that De Jager, in conspiracy with a co-director 
(Shaban), had caused payments totalling R22 665,00 to be paid out of the company's 
66At 317-8. See R C Beuthin "Theft by a Director" (1965) 82 SALJ 479 at 480, where the writer states that 
although the decision in Jona may perhaps be correct in the particular circumstances of that case, Williamson J's 
reasoning does not appear to take sufficient account of the fact that a company's powers to deal with its assets are 
limited. (This matter is discussed more fully in section N of this paper). 
67Supra note 2. 
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funds, that these payments were unauthorised, that they were for his own purposes 
and not for the benefit of the company and that this constituted theft. 
De Jager raised numerous defences. The defence that is relevant here, is that there 
had in law been no theft from the company because De Jager and Shaban, who were 
the sole beneficial shareholders, must be taken to have agreed to the abstractions, 
and therefore, in effect the company was a consenting party. This defence was 
rejected by the court a quo. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction by a 
majority of two to one, with Rumpff J A [as he then was] dissenting. Holmes J A, 
who delivered the judgment of the majority stated : 68 
"In my view the appellant's contention cannot succeed. It involves the proposition 
that de Jager, in his capacity as shareholder, could be a party to the company's 
agreeing to be despoiled by him in his capacity as director. It also in effect gives 
a general right to the company to distribute its assets to shareholders. This 
offends against certain principles of company law basic to the concept of limited 
liability as introduced by Parliament - at any rate in regard to companies limited by 
shares as this one was, namely : 
(a) The company is a separate legal persona, owning the assets. 
(b) The directors manage the affairs of the company in a fiduciary capacity 
to it. 
(c) The shareholders' general right of participation in the assets of the 
company is deferred until winding-up, and then only subject to the claims 
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of creditors. 
Neither shareholders nor directors nor the company itself can violate the foregoing, whatever the 
memorandum or articles may say." 
In view of the above dictum, the decision in R v Jona may be taken to have been 
overruled. 
Rumpff J A was prepared to acquit the accused because it had not been proved that 
the shareholders consent to the appropriation was ultra vires the memorandum. In 
dissenting from the decision of the majority, he stated 89 : 
"I am not aware of any provision whereunder the shareholders of a company 
commit theft when the company (through a resolution of the shareholders) disposes 
of its assets in a manner which is not ultra vires the memorandum. There is also, 
in my view, no duty on the shareholders when they meet as shareholders to act in 
the interests of the company. They can decide what they like - within the objects 
of the memorandum - and when they decide, the company has decided. Nor do 
the directors or the company itself owe a common Jaw fiduciary duty to creditors to 
preserve the assets of the company. For purposes of this case the only question 
to be considered is one of consent. 
[I] f the evidence ... reveals that the confirmation by the shareholders is ultra vires the 
memorandum, to the knowledge of the appellants, it could be said that the 
appellants are guilty of theft because in that case the company cannot be said to 
have given its consent. • 
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The learned judge said that in view of the fact that the memorandum of the company 
was not placed before the court, and as •we do not know what its provisions are·, he 
was unable to decide that the consent of the shareholders was in fact ultra vires the 
memorandum. 
IMPLICATIONS OF DE JAGER 
In terms of our common law, directors are subject to fiduciary duties requiring them 
to exercise their powers bona fide and for the benefrt of the company, and to display 
reasonable care and skill in carrying out their office. Where a director 
misappropriates company property (other than a direct appropriation of company 
funds), this would amount to a breach of his fiduciary duty, which could be ratified by 
an ordinary majority of shareholders in general meeting or cured by the unanimous 
consent of all the shareholders. One must distinguish between two different situations 
in the sphere of the appropriation of company property. "On the one hand, there are 
cases in which the directors have appropriated for themselves, or for others, property 
or economic opportunities which either belonged to the company .... or in regard to 
which the company had some kind of claim, thereby enabling the property or 
opportunities to be regarded as corporate in nature .... , with the consequence that 
their acquisition by the directors can be seen to have taken place at the expense of 
the company. On the other hand, there are cases in which the directors have not 
made their acquisitions at the expense of the company, although their profit may have 
c 
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been obtained in some other way as a result of their office .... : 70 It is not the aim 
of this paper to discuss such misappropriations of company property suffice it to 
mention that although a breach of fiduciary duty could be ratified by a bare majority 
of shareholders at a general meeting or by the unanimous consent of all the 
shareholders, in De Jager the majority held that it was not possible for the company 
in general meeting or even with the unanimous consent of all the members, to ratify 
the conduct of the director. 
Although this result appears to be rather harsh, in cases of the appropriation of 
company funds in majority or working 71 controlled companies, it may be asked 
where the line would be drawn. Should it be for example a 51, 75, 90 or even a 98 
percent majority of the shareholders who need to consent to the appropriation? 
Unked to the question of how much consent is necessary, is the case of creditors, 
existing or potential, and whether or not any kind of a duty is owed to them 72• 
If De Jager was correctly decided 73, then by implication the taking of an exorbitant 
salary by a corporate controller may amount to theft. But, there is no difference in 
principle between taking an exorbitant salary and the situation where the company:\ 
reduces its share capital by an amount of for instance R400 000,00 without 
compliance with the provisions of sections 83 -90 of the Companies Act, or from the 
situation where a holding company charges its subsidiary (whether wholly owned or 
70R C Beuthin "Corporate Opportunities and the No-profit Rule" (1978) 95 SALJ 458 at 482. See also H R 
Hahlo op cit note 58 at 422-6, 435-6. 
71Refer to the definition of control infra section II. 
72See section IV(D) Fraud on the Creditors. 
71-his question is addressed in this dissertation. 
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not) an administration fee of R450 000,00, where on any arms length basis, the most 
generous payment would be RSO 000,00. Such an unlawful reduction of capital 
would amount to a material irregularity which the auditor would then have to report to 
the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board,7" but likewise, could it be said that the 
holding company is guilty of theft? The directors of holding companies normally 
appoint themselves or their nominees to the board of directors of their subsidiaries. 
Often holding companies do not endeavour to charge or even to estimate the exact 
fees for the services they have rendered to their subsidiaries, instead often using a 
method of siphoning profits out of the subsidiary. In terms of the De Jager decision 
this would amount to theft. The directors of the holding companies, in their capacity 
as shareholders of the subsidiary, would be party to the company's agreeing to be 
despoiled of its assets. That is exactly what the Appellate Division in De Jager said 
the shareholders cannot do. 
The conviction in De Jager of an absolute controller of a company was correct, but it 
is the writer's submission that the court went too far. It is respectfully submitted that 
the majority judgment may perhaps have overlooked the conceptual problems 
presented to the court largely owing to a failure to examine criminal principles in the 
corporate context_75 
74 This is in terms of s20(5) of the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act 80 of 1991. 
71-he writer's submission is endorsed by the recent House of Lords decision in R v Gomez [1993]1 AllER 1 
at 40 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson "Whether or not those controlling the company consented or purported to consent 
to the abstraction of the company's property by the accused, he will have appropriated the property of the company. 
The question will be whether the other necessary elements are present, viz was such appropriation dishonest and 
was it done with the intention of permanently depriving the company of such property?" 
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D INTENT TO STEAL 
78 
It is firmly established that the form of mens rea required for theft is intention and the 
intention must relate to all the elements of the crime as well as to the wrongfulness 
requiremenf8• In South Africa, in accordance with the general principles of crimi~al 
law, intention to steal at least in the form of dolus eventualis is requiredn. 
In the context of theft by a corporate controller from his absolutely controlled 
company, this could be defined as follows: the accused subjectively foresees the 
possibility that withdrawing for instance R200 000,00 tor his personal use might 
amount to an appropriation of company funds, and reconciles himself to this 
C R Snyman op cit note 41 at 478. PM A Hunt op cit note 42 at 616. 
nln England s 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 states that to be found guilty, the accused must "dishonestly 
appropriate•. S 2(1) gives some indications as to when the defendant will not be dishonest. 
·s 2(1) : A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as 
dishonest·-
(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other 
of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or 
(b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other's consent if the 
other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it. • 
Dishonesty cannot be assumed, but sometimes it can be inferred, as for instance in the case of Attorney-General's 
Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] QB 624, (discussed below) where defendants drew millions of pounds from 
companies they completely controlled. Here dishonesty could be inferred from the scale of the spending (which 
amounted to millions of pounds), and from the fact that the money was not used for corporate purposes, but was 
spent on cars, yachts, antiques and home improvements. However, Kerr l J held that even in such a situation, the 
dishonesty of the defendants was still for the jury to decide as a matter of fact. 
The English Courts have applied a subjective standard to the meaning of dishonesty. In terms of R v Ghosh [19821 
QB 1053, the defendant would only be found to be dishonest if the reasonable man would regard his conduct as 
dishonest and the defendant realises that the reasonable man would so regard the conduct. Where an absolute 
controller is accused of stealing money from the company, there could well be difficulties in proving that he was 
dishonest, because dishonesty invariably involves foresight of some detriment to others. If the absolute controllers 
do not foresee that their action would have any effect on anyone but themselves, they could not be dishonest. 
C A Snyman op cit note 41 at 15 states that our courts have moved further and further away from the English model 
of criminal law. Dolus eventualis is a concept that is unknown in English law and hails from the Continent as a form 
of intention. 
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possibility or is reckless as to whether his act would amount to theft or nof8• Any 
mistake (in order to exclude intention) need not be reasonable, since the test for 
determining intention, or particular knowledge on the part of the accused, is 
· subjective. To have an intention to steal, the accused: 
(a) must intend to deprive the owner permanently of the full benefrt of its ownership 
that is, the accused must have an intention to appropriate (for the purposes of 
this paper, this can be assumed); 
(b) need not intend to gain from his appropriation; nor need he intend to prejudice 
the owner, that is the company; 
. (c) must not believe that the company, acting in its rights, would permit the 
appropriation, that is, there must be an absence of a claim of right. 
In theory, an accused could escape conviction because of his bona fide belief that h~ 
was entitled to appropriate company monies if either he thought that the company had 
consented, or he bona fide believed that he had a legal right to effect the 
appropriation. The accused's bona fide error precludes an intent to steal79• This 
was recognised by the court in Jona 80 where one of the reasons for the acquittal of 
the accused was that there was a reasonable possibility that he bona fide believed that 
he had the right to take the money in the circumstances, especially as he was the sole 
78Adapted from the definition inC A Snyman idem at 100. 
79P M A Hunt op cit note 42 at 616- 626. 
80Supra note 20. 
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beneficial shareholder and director. Although this defence was raised in De Jager,81 
Holmes J A rejected it stating : 
"De Jager cannot be heard to say that the fact that he and Shahan were sole 
beneficial shareholders enabled him as director to use company funds for his own 
purposes. As to whether De Jager had a bona fide belief that he could do this, 
in Rex v Milne & Erleigh (7), Centlivres C J, said, 'Indeed it is difficult to imagine that 
any person of ordinary intelligence would believe that he had a power to despoil a 
company in relation to which he stood in a fiduciary capacity.'o82 
In a community where people are reasonably acquainted with a knowledge of the 
basic outlines of company law, such a statement is undoubtedly correct, but for the 
lesser trained businessmen of the emerging new South Africa, one might find that they 
have not been sufficiently exposed to company law and they might well confuse their 
right to treat the company assets as their own. It is respectfully submitted that the 
judiciary ought to take cognisance of this possibility. 
IV COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
S v De Jager 83 is the last reported South African decision on the issue of whether 
persons who own all the shares in a company can be guilty of the crime of theft from 
that company. In the international field, the cases are far more recent than De Jager. 
Although the crime of theft is statutorily defined in Australia, New Zealand and 
81Supra note 2. 
821951 (1) SA 791 (A) at 817F. 
83Supra note 2. 
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England, the issues addressed by the courts in the relevant cases can be applied to 
the common·law elements of the crime of theft in South Africa. Although the statutes 
in the abovementioned countries in all material respects identically define the crime 
of theft, the conclusions reached have been different. 
AUSTRALIA (VICTORIA) 
In R v Roffel 84, a full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court, acting as the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, decided by a majority85 that there was no theft where an individual 
obtain~d property from his own company, even where such was done dishonest!~. 
The decision indicated that where a company, through its human agents who are its 
embodiment, consented to the taking of its property, there could be no appropriation 
of property in terms of section 72(1) of the Crimes Act.87 The Australian High Court 
refused to grant special leave to appeal88• 
84(1985) 3 ACLC 339. 
85young C J and Crockett J, Brooking J dissenting. 
~he relevant legislation under which this case was decided was the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which provides: 
·s 72(1): A person steals if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to 
another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. 
s 73(4): Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an 
appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property 
(innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it 
by keeping or dealing with it as owner." 
The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) virtually copies verbatim the Theft Act 1968 of the United Kingdom. Victoria is the only 
state in Australia with a theft provision reflecting the United Kingdom reforms. Queensland, Tasmania and Western 
Australia have distinct criminal codes, while New South Wales and South Australia retain positions which predate 
the English reform. 
871958 (Vic). 
88Unreported, May 17 1985. The High Court did not feel that a reversal of the Victorian Court's decision in 
Roffel was called for due to the prosecutions failure to establish the appropriate lack of company consent at the trial 
and due to the hardship which had already been suffered by the defendant, who had already served a portion of 
his sentence. 
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The relevant facts were briefly as follows : Mr and Mrs Raffel ran a small clothing 
manufacturing business. They then formed a limited company of which they became 
the sole directors and shareholders and sold the business to the company. The price 
remained unpaid. The company's premises were destroyed by fire and the proceeds 
of insurance were paid into the company's bank account. The company's debts 
exceeded the proceeds of the insurance. Despite assurances to creditors that they 
would soon be paid, the husband drew cheques in his own favour on the company's 
account for amounts which represented the vast majority of the insurance proceeds.· 
He was prosecuted for theft from the company and convicted. 
An appeal was brought on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
convictions. Defence counsel raised for the first time the lack of appropriation,89 
stating that the acquiescence of both controllers amounted to the company's consent 
to the taking. The principle question in Roffe! was whether the company had 
. ' 
consented to the applicant's act, and if so, whether that consent negatived 
"appropriation· and therefore, theft. The Supreme Court of Victoria by a majority 
quashed the conviction on appeal, holding that, under the Crimes A~, the 
necessary element of appropriation required proof of adverse interference with or 
usurpation of some right or rights of the owner'11 • As the company was a separate 
legal entity, and in the particular circumstances (through its directing mind and will) 
had consented to the husband's drawing the cheques, it could not be said that he had 
~he applicant contended that the evidence upon which he could have been found guilty of theft was deficient 
in that there was no evidence of an appropriation, or if there was, there was no evidence that the appropriation was 
dishonest. Reliance was placed on the argument that as the applicant and the company were one and the same 
in fact, he could not have acted dishonestly in relation to it. 
001958 (Vic). 
91This followed the approach of R v Morris supra note 53. 
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appropriated the company's property.92 
Von Nessen suggests that Raffel presented the Australian courts with three theoretical 
problems.93 
(1) Did the views expressed in R v Morris on the meaning of appropriation require the 
conclusion that consent to a taking prevents such a taking from being an 
appropriation? The Victorian court was faced with the difficulty of reconciling the 
different views as to what constituted appropriation for the purposes of the statutory 
definition of theft in terms of the decisions of Lawrence and Morris. The majority held. 
that the concept of appropriation as advocated by Lord Roskill in Morris should 
prevail. Thus there would be no adverse interference with or usurpation of an 
owner's rights where he consented to the taking. When Mr Raffel took the money, 
his company had intended him to have it and to use it for his own purposes. The 
motive of the company in making the gift could not convert the applicant's act in 
receiving the money into a usurpation of the company's rights.94 Crockett J held 
that the company had consented to entry into the impugned transactions by the 
instrumentality of the only person through which it could effectively act, thus the 
transactions were not unilateral. By reason of its very acquiescence in the drawing 
92See the judgment of Lord Lowry in R v Gomez supra note 53 where he states that the decision must be 
regarded as a misapplication of Morris, since the majority relied on Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] 2 All 
ER 127, [1972] AC 153, [1971]2 WLR 1166, Hlforthe directing mind doctrine and refused to apply the later English 
case of Attorney-General's Reference {No 2 of 1982} [1984] 2 AllER 216, [1984] QB 624, [1984] 2 WLR 447, C A, 
insisting that the transaction between the company and the husband was 'consensual'. 
93P Von Nessen "Company Controllers, Company Cheques and Theft- an Australian Perspective• [1986] Crim 
LR 154 at 156. 
94Per Young C J at 342. 
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of the cheques on its funds, the company was not acting so that it could be said that 
Mr Raffel was adversely interfering with or usurping some right of ownership 
possessed by the company 95• Under this view of appropriation the majority 
concluded that if the taking was consensual in the true sense (not being induced by 
duress or deception) the taking could not be described as an assumption of the rights 
of the owner 96• 
It is submitted that the dissenting judgment of Brooking J is to be preferred. Applying 
Lawrence, which makes it clear that consent to or authorisation by the owner of the 
taking by the rogue is irrelevant, Brooking J stated that even if the sums of money and 
cheque were taken with the authority of the company, there was still a series of 
appropriations. He saw no necessity to consider whether what was done by the 
applicant was authorised by the company 117• 
(2) Was consent given by a company, which was ultra vires or otherwise prohibited 
by company law, effective consent in this criminal Jaw context? The majority held 
that in its view civil company law concepts such as ultra vires and the maintenance 
of capital rules did not intrude into criminal law to negate the company's consent for 
criminal matters. Both concepts were held to be irrelevant to the determinations of 
criminal law. Brooking J dissenting, asserted that the company law doctrines were 
relevant to the issue of appropriation in several ways98• 
97This dissenting view has been endorsed by the majority of the House of Lords in the recent case of~ 
Gomez supra note 53. 
988oth views in this regard will be elaborated on further on in this paper. t 
r ,.. 
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(3) Were the controllers of a company to be regarded as its directing mind when 
consenting to a taking whereby they themselves were despoiling the company? The 
majority of the court were of the opinion that the applicant director, as the company's 
directing mind and will, was to have been identified with the company as the embodiment of 
the corporate entity. Thus it held that his actions in relation to the company's affairs must 
have been the company's actions. 
Thus it can be said that the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, in the Raffel case, indicated 
a clear preference for the view that any taking by controllers of closely held companies does 
not amount to theft as there is no appropriation. This view was not based on any supposed 
proprietary right which the controllers may have had, either as controllers of the company or 
as recipients of the property under a voidable transaction, but rather was based on the 
ground that there is no appropriation where the comp&ny has consented to the taking99 • 
Company law concepts which might have abrogated the consent were considered irrelevant 
insofar as they related to the appropriation issue. 
NEW ZEALAND 
The decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Craig v Minister of Police100 
closely resembles the reasoning adopted by the majority of the court in Roffel 101 : Here 
the case involved a defendant who was the sole director and beneficial owner of all the 
shares in a company, which together with sixteen other companies in a group controlled by 
99P Von Nessen op cit note 93 at 161. 
100(1983) B C R 141. 
101Supra note 21. 
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the defendant was placed in statutory receivership. The company had purchased a car, the 
balance of the purchase price being financed by way of a conditional purchase agreement. 
A few weeks prior to the receivership, the defendant attempted to assign to himself the 
company's rights in the car. In order to make it appear from the records of the company 
that the car had been badly damaged in an accident and subsequently purchased by the 
defendant in an ensuing tender sale, the motor vehicle was re-licensed as "re-built" and the 
ownership papers were transferred by the company to the defendant. The defendant was 
charged and convicted of theft in the district court. As the High Court had reaffirmed this 
conviction, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal. 102 The appeal was dismissed 
on technical grounds103, but in deference to the arguments presented to it, the Court Ot 
Appeal examined whether the defendant's actions constituted theft within the meaning of 
section 220(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 104• 
The section provides for two forms of theft : theft by taking and theft by conversion. The first 
issue for the Court of Appeal to determine was whether the defendant had converted the car 
to his own use with the intention of permanently depriving the company of its special interest. 
102Under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Ad 1957 {N Z). 
1~he Court of Appeal ruled that it did not possess jurisdidion to grant such special leave to appeal because 
s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Ad 1957 provided for an appeal with leave •against any determination on a 
question of law arising in any general appeal. • The challenge to the High Court ruling was seen not as one of law '•;•a 
but one of fad. 
104S 220 of the New Zealand Crimes Ad defines the crime of theft as: 
"{1) ... the ad of fraudulently and without colour of right taking, or fraudulently 
and without colour of right converting to the use of any person, anything 
capable of being stolen, with intent • 
(a) to deprive the owner, or any person having any special property dr 
interest therein, permanently of such thing or of such property or interest 
. 
(2) For the purposes of sub-sedion {1), the term 'taking' does not include 
obtaining property in or possesion of anything with the consent of the 
person from whom it is obtained, although that consent may be induced 
by a false pretence; but a subsequent conversion of anything of which 
possession only is so obtained may be theft". 
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Adopting the Morris approach to appropriation, it was the view of the court that for the 
purposes of section 220, the act of conversion must involve "some violation or usurpation of 
the rights of the owner or person with special interest"105 , provided that no conversion 
could exist where the act in question was carried out by either the owner, the person with the 
special interest, or a third party acting with the consent of the owner. Therefore the court 
had to determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, the company had consented to 
the would-be act of conversion. 
The Court of Appeal applied the doctrine of identification as laid down in Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd v Nattrass106 , stating that "[h]e is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, 
he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere and 
his mind is the mind of the company. "107 It pointed out that Tesco had been applied in 
' 
New Zealand in Nordik Industries Ltd v Regional Controller of Inland Revenue108• 
Therefore, applying the identification principle, Cooke J said that in casu it was clear that the 
defendant, acting as the company, intended to vest the company's interest in the car in 
himself personally and had given instructions and taken other steps to that end109 • Thus 
the court concluded that the company, in the person of the defendant, had genuinely 
consented to his actions, and that must be regarded as fatal to the charge of theft from the 
company, for the company's consent was inconsistent with a conversion from it110• 
105Craig (1983) B C R 141 at 147. 
106[1972] A C 153. 
107From Craig supra note 105 at 147. 
108 [1976] 1 NZLR 194. 
109Craig supra note 105 at 146 (per Cooke J). 
1101bid at 148. 
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ENGLAND 
The Theft Act 1968 defines theft as the dishonest appropriation of property belonging 
to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it111 • In the 
Crown Court case of Pearlberg and O'Brien,112 the defendants had drawn millions 
of pounds from companies which they completely controlled. These drawings, made 
from overdraft facilities, funded lavish personal expenditure which "could not in any 
way be classed as company expenditure"113 • No attempt was made by the 
defendants to relate the payments to the business activities of the company. 
Repeated professional advice stressed the illegality of their conduct. The companies 
were liquidated with no prospect of meeting the vast indebtedness. Blaker Q C in the 
court a quo acquitted the defendants on the basis that there was no case to answer 
on a charge of theft as the defendants and the company were identical. There was 
complete identification of the company and its controllers and it was not possible to 
steal from oneself. The controllers had consented to the writing of the cheques and 
111S 1(1). Two of the elements of the crime of theft, dishonesty and appropriation, receive further attention in 
the Theft Act. S 2(1) gives some indications as to when the defendant will not be dishonest: 
·s 2(1): A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as 
dishonest-
(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to 
deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or 
(b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other's 
consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it". 
S 3(1) defines appropriation as : 
"Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and thi~ 
indudes where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later 
assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner". 
112[1982] Crim L J 829 (Winchester Crown Court). 
113Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] 2 WLR 447 at 450. 
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the drawing of the money, therefore Blaker Q C concluded that there was in law no 
theft. He stated that he did not think that any jury properly directed would regard it 
to be dishonest for two directors who were also the shareholders to draw money from 
their own companies to pay private bills 114• 
The acquittal was controversial as it violated the basic principle of the separate legal 
personality of the company. Upon reference to the Attorney-General115 , the Court 
of Appeal was asked its opinion on the point of law which was raised in Pearlberg and 
O'Brien· whether a person in total control of a limited liability company, by reason of 
his shareholding and directorship, or two such persons acting in concert, were 
capable of stealing the property of the company. The defence conceded the 
elements of the actus reus, and contested dishonesty, basing their defence on section 
2(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 which precludes a finding of dishonesty if the defendant 
believes that the "other", with full knowledge of the circumstances, would have 
consented to the appropriation. The defence argument stated that since the 
defendants were the sole will and mind of the company, the company must be taken 
to have consented to everything to which they consented. Thus the appropriations 
could not be construed as dishonest under section 2(1)(b). 
The Court of Appeal in Attorney-General's Reference {No 2 of 1982) 116 rejected the 
defence arguments on three grounds. Firstly, Kerr L J stated that the doctrine of 
114Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) idem, at 460 F- H. 
115Under s 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, cited as Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982l!Qm:n. 
1181dem. 
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identification 117 had no bearing on offences committed against the company. Even 
where an individual is the controlling shareholder and director of a company, that 
would not preclude a jury from concluding that the individual could have acted 
dishonestly in his appropriation of company assets. Secondly, section 2(1)(b) did 
not apply because the directors did not possess an honest belief that they were 
entitled to appropriate the funds or that the company had consented to the 
appropriations. The defence argument of identification in relation to section 2(1)(b) 
raised a paradox in that the doctrine of identity alleges identity in all respects and for 
every purpose between the defendants and the company, but section 2(1) (b) uses the 
words "the other•. If there is complete identity, the company cannot be regarded as 
•the other• for the purposes of this provision. Lastly, Kerr L J followed dicta in 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd 118, where Buckley J stated 
that where the essence of an arrangement was to deprive the company improperly of 
a large part of its assets, such knowledge should not be imputed to the company. 
He said that it is a well recognised exception from the general rule that a principal is 
affected by notice received by his agent, that, if the agent is acting in fraud of his 
principal and the matter of which he has notice is relevant to the fraud, that knowledge 
is not to be imputed to the principal. As the company was a victim of the 
conspiracy, Buckley J thought it would be irrational to treat the directors who were 
allegedly parties to the conspiracy, notionally as having transmitted this knowledge to 
the company 119• 
1171dentity between the defendants and the company. Also explained in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 
supra note 92 and applied by Blaker Q C in Pearlberg and O'Brien supra note 112. 
118[1979] Ch 250 (Buckley L, Orr & Goff L J J). 
119Per Buckley L J ibid at 261. 
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Therefore, in Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982} the Court of Appeal held 
that where shareholders or directors had acted illegally or dishonestly in relation to a 
company, knowledge of that dishonesty was not to be imputed to the company. 
In R v Philippou120, the English Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the conclusion 
reached in Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) that a controlling shareholder 
and director can be capable of theft from the company. The case involved two 
defendants who were the sole shareholders and directors of three companies, which 
had since gone into insolvent liquidation. Using corporate money from one of the . 
companies the defendants had bought a block of flats in Spain for their own private 
purposes. Both were charged with stealing chases in action {namely a debt owed by 
a bank to one of the companies), contrary to Section 1 (1) of the Theft Act 1968. 
Counsel for the delinquent directors argued that the reasoning of the majority i~ the 
Australian case of Raffel 121 supported the contention that no appropriation should 
exist in such circumstances. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention. For the 
reasons stated by Kerr L J in Attorney-General's Reference (No.2 of 1982), O'Connor 
L J stated that there was no "consent" by the company on which the appellant could 
rely. The taking was adverse to the rights of the company, and Philippou was 
convicted of theft. 122 
120(1989) 89 Cr App R 290. 
121 [1985] VR 511 (Supreme Court of Victoria), discussed infra 
122G Virgo op cit note 25 states that the conviction of an absolute controller of a company in Philippou was 
correct, but that the reasoning by O'Connor L J in the case is fatally flawed. See also 472- 473. 
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The House of Lords decision in R v Gomez 123 concerned the question of whether 
a charge of theft could be sustained against the respondent in circumstances where 
the owner of the relevant goods could be deemed to have consented to the goods 
being transferred~ This was answered in the affirmative by the Law Lords 124 , but 
the actual decision in the case is not of relevance here. The comments of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson 125 are interesting. Subsequent to agreeing with the analysis of 
the relevant facts in the case by the other Lords, he turned to the company law cases 
dealing with the question of whether a person, or persons, in de facto control of the 
company can be charged with theft from the company when they take the relevant 
goods, money or funds. His Lordship said 125 : 
"If the accused, by reason of being the controlling shareholder or otherwise, is 'the 
directing mind and will of the company' he is to be treated as having validly 
consented on behalf of the company to his own appropriation of the company's 
property. This is apparently so whether or not there has been compliance with the 
formal requirements of company law applicable to dealings with the property of the 
company •••. 
In my judgment this approach was wrong in law... . Where a company is accused 
of a crime the ads and intentions of those who are the directing minds and will of 
the company are to be attributed to the company. That is not the law where the 
charge is that those who are the directing minds and will have themselves 
committed a crime against the company .•.. 
123Supra note 21. 
124See note 53 above. 
125At 40. 
1251dem. 
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Whether or not those controlling the company consented or purported to consent 
to the abstraction of the company's property by the accused, he will have 
appropriated the property of the company. The question will be whether the other 
necessary elements are present, ... . In my judgment the decision in A v Roffe! 
... [is] not correct in law and should not be followed. As for Attorney-General's 
Reference (No 2 of 1982), in my judgment •.• the decision in that case [was] correct, 
as was the decision in A v Philippou• 127 
Under English law, the matter here rests. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
In .Qmig the New Zealand Court of Appeal held the view that for the purposes of the 
definition of theft in section 220 of the New Zealand Crimes Act, conversion involved 
some violation or usurpation of the rights of either the owner or the person with the 
special property interest. This suggests that the act of either taking or conversion 
(as defined in the New Zealand statute) is within the Morris 128 concept of 
appropriation 129 • Thus, the similarity of reasoning between the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal in Craig, and the majority judgment of Roffel, which expressly adopted the 
Morris approach. Both Craig and Roffel concluded, albeit not by the same reasoning, 
127See also similar comments by Lord Lowry ([1993] 1 AllER at 37- 39); Lord Jauncey agreed with the analysis 
of the question of theft from a company expounded by Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted above. Lord Keith also 
supported this view. 
126Discussed above in note 53. 
1~he concept of appropriation put forward by Lord Roskill in Morris has been criticised as being too wide and 
erring fundamentally by including in the concept of appropriation both the adverse interference with rights and the 
usurpation of rights. He suggests that appropriation includes the latter but not the former, aruging that the notion 
of usurpation must involve a taking unto oneself or a denial of the owner's rights or title to a thing. It must amount 
to an assumption, it does not speak of an adverse interference with a right to a thing. See L H Leigh "Some 
Remarks on Appropriation in the Law of Theft after Morris" (1985} 48 MLR 167, 170. 
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that if a company consents to the controlling shareholders having the property, the 
charge of theft from the company must fail. Both invoked the doctrine of 
identification to establish whether the company consented to the particular acts. In 
Craig, the Appeal Court accepted, without any discussion on the point, that the 
doctrine of identification can be used to establish whether a company has consented. 
In Raffel, Crockett J stated that the controllers were to be identified with the company 
and once that conclusion is reached, the actions of the controllers in relation to the 
affairs of the company, must be treated as being the company's actions 130 • 
The utilisation of the doctrine of identification to determine whether a company has 
consented to a particular act for the purposes of determining whether a crime has 
been committed against the company, has also been criticised131 • It leads to 
conclusions such as those reached in the Raffel and Craig cases, that "a person 
whom common sense would regard as a thief, is not a thief in law•. 132 To allow 
a sole shareholder to escape charges of theft on the ground that the company 
property is in substance his, "is to encourage unwarranted assertions of dominion over 
the only property to which creditors can look, and to sanction a total inconsistency 
between the civil law and the criminal law, resulting in an extraordinary indulgence to 
controllers of closely held companies•. 133 If there is no prejudice to creditors and 
the matter is simply an irregularity, no dishonesty or intent to steal will be proved. But 
130G Williams "Theft by Company Controllers - A New Zealand view" (1989) 38 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 913 at 918. 
131See G Williams idem; G A Sullivan op cit note 6; P Von Nessen op cit note 93. 
132Aoffel supra note 21 at 343 (per Crockett J). 
133G A Sullivan op cit note 6 at 518. 
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if the appropriation occurs in circumstances where there is dishonesty or intent to 
steal, it is befitting that the criminal law conform to the civil law and regard company 
property as property belonging to another, even against an absolute controller of a 
company. 
The doctrine of identification is a doctrine of imputed or ascribed liability 134 and was 
conceived to meet the inadequacy of the ·organic theory• of company law which did 
not encompass particular forms of liability based on personal fault135 • It was never 
intended to be used to establish whether in company law a company has consented 
to a particular act. This was recognised by Kerr L J in Attorney-General's Reference 
(No 2 of 1982) 135 when he noted that the doctrine of identification has no bearing 
on offences committed against the company. It merely illustrates that where any 
offences are committed by defendants in relation to the affairs of the comp~ny, the 
defendants ·are• the company in a sense that the offences would be capable of being 
treated as offences committed by the company itself. Insofar as concerns the internal 
relationship betweem the company and its organs, dishonest or fraudulent acts 
directed against the company by its organs are not attributed to the company. 
The acceptance by the majority in Roffel and by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
134l H Leigh "The Criminal liability of Corporations and other Groups• (1977) 9 Ottawa L R 247, 255. 
135ln terms of the organic theory the company is made liable, not because the controllers are its alter ego, bul·; . 
because they are an organic part of the company's ego itself. Whether they are, depends on whether they have 
control and managerial discretion, either generally over the company's business or over that particular part of it to 
which the transaction relates. See Tesco Supermarkets ltd v Nattrass supra note 92. Gower states that this 
organic theory has not been carried to absurd extremes in English law in that "if those who constitute the head and 
brains are engaged in defrauding the company, they cannot successfully defend a civil action by the company (as 
in Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture ltd supra note 23) or a criminal prosecution (as in Attorney-
General's Reference (No 2 of 1982); R v Philippou supra) by saying 'we were the controlling organs of the company 
and accordingly the company knew all about it and consented.'" See L C B Gower op cit note 5 at 196-7. 
135Supra note 23 at 461. 
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Craig, of the proposition that consent by a comp~ny to the taking of its property 
prevents such a taking from being an appropriation, leads to an anomalous result 
when looked at in conjunction with the decision in Attorney-General's Reference (No 
2 of 1982). Von Nessen argues that even though the owners of a closely held 
company who receive property from it might still be considered as acting dishonestly 
(as indicated by the English Court of Appeal), the issue of dishonesty itself becomes 
superfluous in this context if the Raffel [and Craig] view that there is no appropriation 
where the company consents, is correct137 • This could be attributable to either 
different applications of the requirement of dishonesty in England, Australia and New 
Zealand, or to differing attitudes towards the use of civil law concepts to resolve 
criminal law problems, as well as underlying differences in the civil law itself. 
In British law both the Court of Appeal in A v Philippou and the House of Lords in 
A v Gomez expressly disapproved of the decision in A v Raffel. In Gomez Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson laid down explicitly that in his judgment the decision in Raffel was 
not correct in law and should not be followed. With regard to Attorney-General's 
Reference (No 2 of 1982), the Lord was of the opinion that both the concession made 
by counsel (that there had been an appropriation) and the decision in that case were 
correct, as was the decision in A v Philippou. 
V THE APPUCATION OF COMPANY LAW PRINCIPLES TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE 
OF THEFT 
In South African law, a valid consent by a company to an abstraction of company 
137P Von Nessen •My Body, Myself: Problems of Identity in Corporate Crime• [1985] Company and Securities 
h..J.235 at 241. 
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property is a ground of justification negativing unlawfulness '38.Therefore in 
determining the question of whether an absolute controller, or in fact any corporate 
controller, can be convicted of stealing from his company, regard must be had to the 
question of whether the company can be deemed to consent to the appropriation'39• 
The dictum of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the recent House of Lords decision of R v 
Gomez 140 states that "in any event, your Lordship's decision in this case ... renders 
the whole question of consent by the company irrelevant. Whether or not those 
controlling the company consented or purported to consent to the abstraction of the 
company's property by the accused, he will have appropriated the property of the 
company. The question will be whether the other necessary elements [of the crime 
of theft] are present .... • Although this decision is recent and the above dictum 
directly in point, it is submitted that a House of Lords decision is merely persuasive 
authority to our courts and therefore it is still necessary in our law to discuss the issue 
of consent and the application of company law principles to a criminal charge of theft. 
In the Australian case of R v Roffel141 , the majority held that company law principles 
(specifically whether the applicant's acts were intra vires or ultra vires) were irrelevant 
in determining whether the applicant could be convicted of theft. Crockett J thought 
that this was a question which "should not be allowed to intrude into this branch of the 
criminal law·. 142 The better view must surely be that of the dissenting judgment of 
138Refer section 111 (C) Wrongfulness. 
139Both the cases of R v Jona {supra note 20) and S v De Jager (supra note 2) canvassed the issue of 
corporate consent. See section Ill (C) Wrongfulness. 
140Supra note 21 at 40. 
141Supra note 21. 
142Per Crockett J supra note 21 at 347. 
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Brooking J who asked pertinently at what point one would stop having regard to the 
company law. The learned judge enquired, in view of the fact that account is taken 
of the position of the applicant and his wife as directors and shareholders, how much 
further a jury would be permitted to enter the forbidden realm of company law. As 
Smith states : 143 
"VYhen the civil law is relevant, it must surely be taken into account in its entirety. 
The criminal court cannot pick and choose. The corporation is a creature of the 
civil law with no existence in the physical world; and, when the court has regard to 
its existence, it must surely have regard to all its relevant characteristics." 
Even criminal lawyers should consider corporate principles in their entirety. The 
criminal law recognises the existence of companies, which exist by virtue of the civil 
law. Ignoring the rest of the civil law in which companies operate would be 
dangerous and deceptive. The question of criminal liability of a corporate controller 
essentially raises corporate principles and this was implicitly recognised by the 
Appellate Division· in both the majority and dissentinQ judgments of De Jager. 
There are five relevant principles in deciding whether the absolute controller is able to 
authorise an abstraction and so gain the company's consent. The alter ego doctrine 
and the principle of informal authorisation could be relied on by the defendant in trying 
to show that he is able to authorise the abstraction. The doctrines of ultra vires, 
maintenance of capital and fraud on the creditors could be relied on by the 
prosecution to show that an absolute controller is unable . to authorise the 
143(1985) Crown L R 320 at 322. 
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abstraction. 144 
A CORPORATE CONSENT 
The cases under discussion 145 each involved instances of closely controlled 
companies where the acts in question occurred with the full knowledge and consent 
of all the shareholders. In company law, a company can only be bound by or validly 
consent to a particular action by a resolution of one of its constitutional organs, either 
. 
the members in general meeting or the board of directors. 
.;_.· 
(a) CONSENT BY THE MEMBERS IN GENERAL MEETING 146 
As a general rule, anything resolved upon by a bare majority of those who voted at the 
meeting will bind the company and all its members. The unanimous informal consent 
of the shareholders would have the same effect even though not given at a general 
meeting. The company's capacity to consent to any act (even when all the members 
unanimously agree) is strictly limited: the members in general meeting can effectively 
only consent to those things to which it has the power (express or implied) to consent 
by virtue of the company's memorandum of association. The members in general 
meeting can only consent to those things to which the Act or any other law expressly 
144G Virgo op cit note 25 at 475. 
145R v Jona supra note 20; S v De Jager supra note 2; R v Roffe! supra note 21; Craig v Police supra note 105; 
Attorney-General's Reference {No 2 of 1982) supra note 23. 
146R C Beuthin "Theft by a Director" (1965) SAW 479. 
. 
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or impliedly permits it to consent. Any consent given outside of the above 
parameters would be illegal and of no force or effect. 
Conduct by unanimous assent has been recognised in a long line of South African 
147 and English decisions 148 • Referring to unanimous consent where an absolutely 
controlled company is involved, it was observed that "where an absolute controller has 
the irresistible power to determine what policies the company shall pursue, there is 
nothing which he himself may do in the company's name which could in practice be 
unauthorised. "149 The requisite formalities may be dispensed with provided the 
informal consent is unanimous and all the members are fully appraised as to what they 
have assented to 150• An illegal result cannot be obtained validly through 
unanimous consent. Thus in S v De Jager 151 it was held than an illegal 
appropriation of corporate assets cannot be justified on the ground of unanimous 
assent by all shareholders and directors. In Parker and Cooper Ltd v Reading 152 
it was stated that where the transaction is intra vires and honest, and especially if it 
is for the benefit of the company, it cannot be upset where all the corporators have 
given their assent to it. It does not matter whether that assent is given 
simultaneously or at different times 153• 
~ 
The real issue is whether the informal 
141Dublin v Diner 1964 (1) S A 799 (D); Gohlke and Schneider v Westies Minerale 1970 (2) S A 685 (A); 
Marrock Plase (PM Ud v Advance Seed Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 (3) SA 403 (A). 
1481n re Duomatic ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365, [1969] 1 AllER 161; Parker and Cooper Ltd v Reading [1926] Ch 975; 
In re Bailey. Haye and Co [1971] 1 WLR 1357; [1971] 3 All ER 693. 
149Per Mustill L J in McHugh and Tringham (1989) 88 Cr App R 385, 393. 
150Re Bailey, Haye & Co supra note 148 held that acquiescence is enough. 
151Supra note 2 at 624 - 625. 
152Supra note 148. 
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procedure that is adopted is "unreal or ... a cloak under which a conspiracy to defraud 
was concealed." 154 
In the case of absolutely controlled companies, where the directors take for 
themselves large amounts of the company funds, the question may be asked whether 
these payments amount to directors remuneration, donations or gratuitous payments. 
Directors remuneration is determined by the company in general meeting 155 • · 
Beuthin states that "the mere fact that the remuneration or gratuity properly voted to 
a director may be excessively high, would not necessarily make the payment thereof 
theft. The courts would be slow to interfere with the discretion of businessmen who 
can safely be left as a rule to determine what is in fact in the best interests of the 
company." 156 Where the funds taken by a director are not genuine remuneration, 
but rather a disguised attempt to return capital to shareholders, the payment will be 
in contravention of the Companies Act and may amount to theft notwithstanding the 
consent of all the shareholders 157• 
Perhaps it could be argued that the large payment to a director of company funds 
1~he Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v The Standard Trust Company of New York [1911] AC 
498, 505 per Viscount Haldane. 
1 ~able A article 78 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
156R C Beuthin op cit note 146 at 483.- See also section VI Conclusion infra. 
1571n re Hatt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 (Ch), it was held that where payments of remuneration to 
a director are made under the authority of the company acting in general meeting pursuant to an express power 
in its articles to award directors remuneration, and there is no question of fraud on the company's creditors or on 
minority shareholders, the competence of the company to award the remuneration depends on whether the 
payments are genuinely directors remuneration (as opposed to disguised gifts out of capital) and not on an abstract 
test of benefit to the company. The amount of remuneration awarded in such circumstances is a matter of 
company management and, provided there has been a genuine exercise of the company's power to award 
remuneration, it is not for the court to determine if, or to what extent, the remuneration awarded is reasonable. !n 
re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] Ch 442; [1982] 3 WLR 431; [1982] 3 AllER 1045 (CA) Oliver J held that certain 
payments made to a shareholder- director of the company professedly as director's remuneration were not, in fact, 
made in genuine exercise of the power to remunerate directors, but constituted a gratuitous distribution to a 
shareholder qua shareholder out of capital and therefore were unlawful. 
Page 50 
would amount to a donation. In terms of section 34 of the Act, a company has 
plenary powers to enable it to realise its main and ancillary objects. Although one 
of these plenary powers is to make donations, because a donation must be made to 
enable the company to realise its main and ancillary objects, the donation must be 
made for a purpose reasonably connected with, or done for the benefit and promotion 
of the prosperity of the company. In Hutton v West Cork Railway Co 158 Bowen L J 
clarified the principles governing charity by companies. 
•Most businesses require liberal dealings. The test is not whether it is bona fide, 
but whether as well as being done bona fide, it is done within the ordinary scope 
of the company's business, and whether it is reasonably incidental to the carrying 
on of the company's business for the company's benefit ... • The law does not 
say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale 
except such as are required for the benefit of the company ... : 159 
Companies do have the power to make gratuities payments to directors, but their 
powers to do so are limited. In Parke v Daily News Ltd 160, Plowman J concluded 
that a company's funds cannot be applied in making ex gratia payments as such, and 
that the court will enquire into the motives actuating any such payment, and the 
objects which it is intended to achieve. In In re Lee Behrens & Co Ltd, 161 Eve J 
put forward three tests which gratuitous payments had to satisfy: 
158[1883] 23 Ch 654 (CA). 
159See also De Vos J in Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of S A v Die (1963) Ambagsaalvereniqing 1967 
(1) SA 586 (T) at 594. 
160[1962] Ch 927. 
161 [1932] 2 Ch 46. 
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1. Is the transaction reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's 
business? 
2. Is it a bona fide transaction? 
3. Is it done for the benefit and to promote the prosperity of the company? 
Thus Plowman J held that gratuitous payments will only be upheld if these three tests 
are satisfied 182• Despite these pronouncements, if all the shareholders consent to 
a director's taking for himself an ex gratia payment which is unrelated to the interests 
of the company or to the carrying on of its business, taking the payment will not 
amount to theft provided the shareholders intended it to be taken, and it is taken from 
funds which are available for distribution as dividends. Thus an absolute controller 
would enjoy a large measure of immunity vis-a-vis takings of his company's money, 
provided he is prudent enough to link his takings either to a remunerative package, 
to a company donation, or to an ex gratia payment that satisfies Eve J's three tests. '.~ 
De Jager did none of these . 
. (b) CONSENT BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The apparent consent of the board of directors may be ineffective on three grounds : 
1 . The transaction is ultra vires the company 163; 
182P L Davies in his case note on Halt Garage 1983, Journal of Business Law, 243 suggests that according to 
Horsley & Weight and Halt Garage the tests laid down by Eve J in In re Lee Behrens & Co Ud remain relevant to 
the question of the propriety of the exercise of the power, but not to the question of the capacity of the company 
to exercise it. This is equally applicable to South African law. 
163Refer section V (B) The Ultra Vires Doctrine. 
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2. The directors, in purporting to consent, may have usurped a power which they 
never had; 
3. The directors in purporting to consent, exercised powers which they actually 
had, but for purposes other than those for which they were conferred. 
Directors do not have the power to deal with the company funds as if they were their 
own. They do not have the power to do as they please with everything belonging 
to the company, including using it for their own benefit or taking it for themselves. 
No such power could ever be conferred upon them. In a majority controlled 
company, where one person is both a director and a shareholder, when he attends 
shareholders meetings qua shareholder, he may vote in his own selfish interests. But 
when he dons his robes of director's office and acts qua director, he is only entitled 
to have regard to the interests of the company 184• 
THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE 
In the case of an absolutely controlled company, the question arises as to how the 
company may authorise or consent to a transaction. The notion of alter ego was 
devised in order to attribute "human· fault elements, for example mens rea to 
companies, thus making the company personally, as opposed to vicariously liable,~. 
In terms of the alter ego doctrine the mental element of those persons who are the 
directing mind and will of the company, or those persons who exercise primary control 
184R C Beuthin op cit note 146 at 484. 
1~he step of ascribing the actions of some person or persons personally to the company was first taken in 
Lennards Carrying Company v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (1915] AC 705. Here Lord Haldane L C held that in 
respect of the actions of the board of directors or the actions of a managing director, the company was liable not 
vicariously, but personally. These persons were the after ego of the company. 
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over the company's affairs, can be imputed to the company and so inculpate the 
company, making it criminally or delictually liable 166• 
The term alter ego is used here in the narrow sense. It accepts that the company 
does have a separate personality from that of its controllers, but it has regard to the 
mental elements of the controllers to enable the company to operate successfully. 
Thus the directing mind principle is referred to as the alter ego doctrine. Alter ego 
is accurate, as it means "second self" rather than •same self" 187• The doctrine of 
identification is a different concept 188• It is adopted when the directing mind is the 
company, and there is a total identification between the company and the controllers. 
In terms of the alter ego doctrine, the company is a different person in law, but to 
enable the company to function, the defendant's mental element is attributed to the 
company 169• The question in the present context, is whether the alter ego doctrine 
can be used by the controllers of a company to exculpate them from criminal liability 
by authorisation of the abstraction. 
1~he alter ego idea has been applied with varying degrees of fidelity in the fields of criminal law, taxation and 
merchant shipping. 
187G Virgo op cit note 25 at 478. 
1~he writer agrees with Virgo op cit note 25 when he states that he disagrees with the view of Lord Reid in 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 171, who said that: "The person who speaks and acts as the 
company is not alter. He is identified with the company." In the same vein, Estey J in Canadian Dredge and Dock 
Co Ltd v The Queen (1985) 19 SCC .(3 d) 1, 15 (Supreme Court of Canada), called the alter ego theory the 
identification theory. A doctrine of identification is more appropriate where the corporate veil is pierced. It is 
incorrect so far as the directing mind and will is concerned, as there is not total identification, but only "identification• 
for the purposes of attribution of mens rea If the directing mind principle is founded upon identification, then it 
is difficult to explain the limitation on it where there is fraud on the company (discussed infra). If a doctrine of 
identification is adopted then the directing mind is the company, and it is not possible to defraud oneself. 
Therefore, the directing mind principle shall be referred to as the "alter ego• doctrine. 
169L H Leigh "The Alter Ego of a Company" (1965) 28 MLR 584. 
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It has never been entirely clear who may be a corporate alter ego, therefore the first 
task is to identify who the directing mind and will of the company is. The quantity of 
shares that a person holds is irrelevant to the question of whether he is the corporate 
alter ego. The essential criterion is the possession of primary control, as opposed 
to delegated authority, in respect of the business of the company 170• Where there 
is an absolute controlling shareholder who is also a director, clearly he will be the alter 
ego. Where by virtue of his shareholding, a person is an absolute controller, but is 
not also a director of the company, the application of the alter ego doctrine is more 
complex. Such a person may be the directing mind and will of the company, 
especially if he is a shadow director. In the Lady Gwendolen 171 the directing mind 
of a company was held to include any person to whom the owner has extended all the 
relevant powers of control. Thus identifying the alter ego amounts to the realistic 
task of establishing in whose hands primary control of the company lies. An 
absolute controller who has control through the organ of the general meeting would 
clearly be held to be the directing mind and will of the company 172• 
In R v Jona 173, Williamson J implicitly gave support to the use of the alter ego 
doctrine enabling an absolute controller to authorise an abstraction. He stated that 
"if the whole of the company ... knows that the money has been taken, consents to 
it being taken, you are not committing a theft if you take the money.· This was 
overruled in De Jager when the Appellate Division rejected the argument that the 
170G Virgo op cit note 25 at 478. 
171 [1965]1 Uoyd's Rep 335, [1965] 2 AllER 283 (CA). 
172Denning L J stressed the importance of control in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons 
Ltd [1957] 1 OB 159, 172. So did Viscount Dilhorne in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 187. 
173Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Nai-Keung (1988) 86 Cr App R 174; Houghton and Co v Nothard, Lowe 
and Wills Ltd [1928] A C 1; Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290. 
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defendant, in his capacity as shareholder, could be a party to the company agreeing 
to be despoiled by him in his capacity as director. By implication, the court was 
enforcing one of the limitations on the application of the alter ego doctrine mentioned 
below. It is the submission of Virgo 174, that the alter ego doctrine is both valid and 
important in this context. He states that companies must be able to consent and 
authorise. This it does through the general meeting, unanimous informal consent of 
all shareholders or through the board of directors. The alter ego doctrine was 
specifically developed to enable companies to be found liable in civil cases or 
convicted in criminal cases by virtue of the attribution of mental elements. He states 
that there is no reason, in logic or in policy, for preventing the attribution to the 
company of mental elements of those who are the mind and will of the company. 
Thereby, the consent of the directing mind would negate an appropriation. 
There are certain limitations which apply to exclude the application of the alter ego 
doctrine. The doctrine will not apply if: 
(a) the directing mind acts outside the scope of his express or implied 
authority; 175 or 
(b) the directing mind acts for his own benefit; 176 or 
114Supra note 20 at 317-318. 
175G Virgo op clt note 25 at 479. 
176D P P v Kent & Sussex Contractors Ltd (1944] K B 146, 156. In Canadian Dredge and Dock Co Ud (1985) 
19 sec (3 d) 1 I 17 lt was stated that the •act in question must be done by the directing force of the company when 
carrying out his assigned function in the corporation. • Authority would not seem to cause a problem in the case 
of an absolute controller as he will have the power to authorise an abstraction, subject to three limitations on his 
ability to authorise, discussed infra 
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(c) the directing mind acts in fraud of the company. m 
Where a controller milks company funds entirely for personal consumption, he does 
not represent the directing mind and will of the company, but acts in his own capacity. 
The accused in De Jager would surely fall in this category. Where the directing mind 
is acting for his own benefit, most often it will also be in fraud of the company and the 
alter ego doctrine will not apply. The last two limitations will be relevant where the 
absolute controller is abstracting property from the company. When one of the 
limitations apply, the consent of the controller cannot be attributed to the company! 
and the abstraction would amount to an appropriation. 
Canadian Dredge & Dock Co v The Queen 178 is a decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in which the outer limits of the alter ego doctrine were analysed. The court 
held that the doctrine will only operate where the Crown demonstrates that the action 
taken by the directing mind -
(a} was within the field of operation assigned to him; 
(b) was not totally in fraud of the ~rporation; and 
(c) was by design or result partly for the benefit of the company. 
The case was concerned with the criminal liability of a company, and whether such 
corporate criminal liability arises where the directing mind conspiring to defraud acted 
in fraud of the corporation, or for his own benefit, or contrary to instructions not to act 
mlnternational Sales and Agencies Ltd v Marcus [1982] 3 All ER 551 : A person will step out of his role as 
corporate alter ego when his conduct is unrelated to the affairs of the company. 
178Canadian Dredge and Dock Co Ltd v The Queen supra note 168 at 5. 
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illegally. The court explained the application of the alter ego doctrine generally. 
It stated that the doctrine merges the board of directors, the managing director, the 
manager or anyone else to whom was delegated the governing executive authority of 
the corporation, and the conduct of any of the merged entities is thereby attributed to 
the corporation. By this means, a corporation may have more than one directing 
mind. Each company has a directing mind and the fact that he may have defrauded 
the corporate employer, acted in part for his own benefit, or acted in breach of 
instructions, does not remove the company's criminal liability in the circumstances. 
However, the outer limit of the delegation doctrine will be reached and exceeded when 
the directing mind ceases completely to act, in fact or in substance, in the interests 
of the corporation. When the directing mind intentionally defrauds the corporation 
and when his wrongful actions form the substantial part of the regular activities of his 
office, the manager cannot realistically be considered to be the directing mind of the 
corporation. Where the criminal act is totally in fraud of the corporate employer and 
where the act is intended to and does result in benefit exclusively to the employee 
manager, the employee directing mind ceases to be a directing mi~d of the 
corporation, and consequently his acts cannot be attributed to the corporation under 
the doctrine. 179 
Although the case was concerned with the criminal liability of a company, it is 
submitted that the decision also applies to prevent the exculpation of controllers by 
means of the alter ego doctrine. The principle in Canadian Dredge has been followed 
in other decisions 180 and there is also support for it in certain English cases. 181 
179s ~ note 168 at 5. 
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For example, in Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1982), Kerr L J suggested that 
the alter ego doctrine did not apply where the shareholders and directors •had acted 
illegally or dishonestly in relation to the company•, and in the civil case of Belmont 
Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd Buckley L J stated 182 that "if the 
agent is acting in fraud of his principal and the matter of which he has notice is 
relevant to the fraud, that knowledge is not to be imputed to the principle: 
There is some confusion as to whether the limitation relating to fraud on the company 
applies where there is an absolute controller. In the New Zealand case of Nordik 
Industries Ltd v Regional Controller of Inland Revenue 183, Cooke J stated that : 
• ... once identification has been made out, it must follow, ... , that ... , the question 
of fraud on the company becomes irrelevant and indeed meaningless. A person 
cannot defraud himself. The essence of the doctrine of identification is that the 
individual is treated as the company's self. They are one and the same. 
Presumably the identification does not extend to matters totally unconnected with 
the business of the company: 
This illustrates the danger of calling the directing mind principle, the "identification 
doctrine·. It ignores the fundamental axiom of the separate personality of the 
company. The limitation relating to fraud should apply to absolutely controlled 
181Standard Oil Co of Texas v U.S. 307 F 2 d 120 (5th Cir 1962); Clarkson and lyon (1986) 24 A Crim R 54; 
Clarkson (1987) 25 A Crim R 277; Maher (1986) 23 F l R 332. 
182Supra note 23 at 262. 
183 [1976] 1 NZLR 194 at 202. 
companies to prevent a controller from authorising an abstraction 184 • 
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Holmes 
J A's judgment in De Jager lends support to this proposition. Thus it can be 
assumed that under South African law, the abovementioned limitations, excluding the 
operation of the alter ego doctrine, are equally applicable. 
B THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE 
In his dissenting judgment inS v De Jager, Rumpff J A [as he then was] stated : 
"I am not aware of any provision whereunder the shareholders of a company 
commit theft when the company (through a resolution of the shareholden?) disposes 
of its assets in a manner which is not ultra vires the memorandum ... . If the 
evidence ••. reveals that the confirmation by the shareholders is ultra vires the 
memorandum, to the knowledge of the appellants, it could be said that the 
appellants are guilty of theft because in that case the company cannot be said to 
have given its consent.· 185 
This was an accurate statement of the law before the introduction of the Companies 
Act. In terms of the ultra vires doctrine, the capacities and powers. of a comp~ny 
were limited to those capacities and powers for which the objects clause in the 
memorandum of association had made provision. Any act beyond the capacity of 
the company was ultra vires and void because the company did not exist for a 
purpose beyond its capacity. If any abstraction from the company was ultra vires 
it could not be authorised. In the present context, the doctrine· would apply to 
• 
prevent authorisation of an abstraction from the company, thus enabling the 
184G Virgo op cit note 25 at 482. 
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abstraction to become an appropriation. This was because companies could only 
authorise or consent where they had capacity to do so. 
Since the introduction of section 36 of the Act, assuming that the abstractions of 
money from the company were ultra vires, that will no longer prevent the company 
from authorising or consenting to the transaction 186 • Although certain aspects 
concerning section 36 are still in dispute187 , the effect of this section is that even if 
an abstraction is beyond the capacity of the company, it cannot be impugned on the 
ground of being ultra vires 188• Section 36 has ·except as between the company 
and its members or directors, or as between its members and its directors•, effectively 
abolished the ultra vires doctrine. Because of this exception, it is in this context 
necessary to make a distinction between companies which are absolutely controlled 
and companies where the wrongdoers have only majority control. Where there has 
been an abstraction from an absolutely controlled company, the abstraction would go 
unchallenged, as all the controlling shareholders are also the wrongdoers. The 
consent of the company to the abstraction would not be invalidated by reason of the 
abstraction being beyond the capacity of the company. Conversely, where the 
186Section 36 states that : "No act of a company shall be void by reason only of the fact that the company was 
without capacity or power so to act or because the directors had no authority to perform that act on behalf of the 
company by reason only of the said fact and, except as between the company and its members or directors, or as 
between its members and its directors, neither the company nor any other person may in any legal proceedings 
assert or rely upon any such lack of capacity or power or authority. • 
187H S Cilliers op cit note 59 at 179-80; H R Hahlo op cit note 58 at 106-8; S J Naude "Company Contracts: 
The Effect of Section 36 of the New Act" (1982) 99 SAW 315 at 335. 
1880n the effect of s 36, see also M l Benade "Exit Ultra Vires• (1972) 35 THRHR 281; J S Mclennan "The 
Ultra Vires Rule and the Turquand Rule" (1979) 96 SAW 392; M S Blackman "The Capacity, Powers and Purposes 
of Companies: The Commission and the New Companies Act" (1975) 8 CILSA 1, esp at 34ft; AN Oelofse "Artikel 
36 van die Maatskappywet versus Artikei15A van die Akteswet" (1979) 42 THRHR 100; M G Fredman "A Note on 
Section 36 of the Companies Act" (1982) 99 SAW 283; M J Oosthuizen "Aanpassing van die Verteenwoordigingsreg 
in Maatskappyerband" 1979 TSAR 1; J S A Fourie "Die Wisselwerking tussen Suid-Afrikaanse 
Maatskappyeregleerstukke" (1988) 51 THRHR 218 and M S Blackman "Directors' Duty to Exercise their Powers fer 
an Authorised Business Purpose· (1990) 2 SA Mere W 1. 
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wrongdoers only possess majority control of the company, the issue of ulira vires will 
still be relevant. In such a case, the shareholders who are not party to the 
abstraction can, in terms of section 36, restrain the company from authorising an act 
beyond its capacity188• Such an injunction 1110 would only be appropriate before 
the company concludes any contract with the wrongdoers. The option of holding the 
directors personally liable for acting beyond their authority and in breach of their 
fiduciary duties is still ~vailable191 • This will only be relevant where the wrongdoers 
have majority control, as these duties are owed to the company and therefore can only 
be enforced by the company. In the exceptional circumstance of an appropriation 
of a large part of company assets, members may be entitled to enforce these duties 
on behalf of the company 192 • In the light of section 36, ultra vires is no longer 
relevant in determining whether an abstraction amounts to an appropriation. Where 
there has been unanimous assent by all the shareholders, a gratuitous disposition or 
abstraction of company property could not be challenged .on the grounds of lack of 
capacity. 
Where the abstraction or gratuitous disposition takes place from a close corporation, 
no question of the capacity of the corporation can be raised, as a corporation has 
unlimited capacity 193• The corporation''s capacity is not affected by the statement 
1880n the basis of the contract which exists in terms of s 65(2) of the Act between the company and its 
members gua members, a member may rely on such contract to prevent the company from acting in contravention 
of its contractual obligation. 
1110Achieved by an application for an interdict. 
191 M S Blackman "Directors' Duty to Exercise their Powers for an Authorised Business Purpose• (1990) 2 SA 
Mere L J 1 at 9. 
192See H S CiUiers op cit note 59 at 288 19.01 et seq in this regard. 
193Section 2(4) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 provides that: "A corporation shall have the capacity 
and powers of a natural person of full capacity in so far as a juristic person is capable of having such capacity or 
of exercising such powers." 
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of the principle business in the founding statement. Therefore, any abstraction of 
property or gratuitous disposition from a close corporation need not be in the 
commercial interests of the corporation. The corporation is analogous to an 
individual who has the unfettered power to make gifts to whomever he likes, for 
whatever reason 194 • The negation of a company's or corporation's consent can be 
examined with more success from the standpoint of either the principles of capital 
maintenance or fraud .. on creditors. 
C MAINTENANCE OF CAPITAL 
The maintenance of capital doctrine may be relied on to support the conclusion .that 
an absolute controller is unable to consent on behalf of the company to an 
abstraction. The approach followed by the courts in regard to the maintenance of 
capital is that "the share capital of a limited company constitutes the fund to which 
creditors of the company must look to for the satisfaction of their claims. Creditors 
are accordingly entitled to rely on the fact that such fund, although it may be 
diminished or lost in the course of the company's business, must not otherwise be 
impaired by being diverted from the objects of the company.• 195 In the dissenting 
judgment of Brooking J in Roffel, the learned judge pointed out that the underlying 
rationale for such a principle was the need to ensure that the company's capital was 
not improperly reduced to the prejudice of its unsecured creditors 196 • A corollary 
of this principle is that a disposition of the company's property which contravenes the 
rules of capital maintenance cannot be ratified, not even by a unanimous decision of 
194H S Cilliers op cit note 59 at 614. 
1951dem at 314. 
196Roffel supra note 21 at 351. 
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the shareholders 197• This is relevant to the present paper, because if the funds or 
property received by the controlling shareholders can be classified as a return of 
capital in contravention of the capital maintenance doctrine, then it cannot be argued 
by the controlling shareholders that the company, through the unanimous consent of 
all the shareholders, has consented to the disposition of the property 1aa. 
In the realm of abstractions from absolutely controlled companies, the maintenance 
of capital doctrine is of particular importance. Authorisation or ratification of a 
payment, even by all of the shareholders, is not possible if the maintenance of capital 
rules are transgressed. As long as it is capital that is being abstracted from the 
company, the absolute controller is unable to authorise the abstraction. Williams 199 
states that one of the fundamental weaknesses of the capital maintenance rules is that 
they do not take into account the amount owed to creditors. Pennington 200 
suggests that the capital maintenance doctrine should include both the monies raised 
by the issue of shares as well as the amount raised by borrowing 201 • Where 
corporate controllers are charged with theft from their companies, this conclusion is 
appropriate, for such controllers invariably rely on borrowed funds to achieve their 
197Roffel idem; Re Exchange Banking Co [1882] Ch D. at 519 
1aaG Williams "Theft by Company Controllers- A New Zealand View" (1989) 38 ICLQ 913, 921. 
199G Williams idem at 922. 
200R R Pennington Company Law 5 ed (1985) 451. 
201 1n support of this proposition, Pennington cites Undley L J in the case of In re George Newman & Co [1895] 
1 Ch 674, 686 : 
"To make presents of profits is one thing and to make them out of capital or out of money 
borrowed by the company is a very different matter. Such money cannot be lawfully divided 
amongst shareholders themselves, nor can it be given away by them for nothing to their directors 
so as to bind the company in its corporate capacity. • 
• 
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objectives 202• This corresponds with the rationale of the doctrine, which is to 
protect the position of the shareholders and creditors. 
D FRAUD ON CREDITORS 
There are two main reasons for the conviction on a charge of theft from a company : 
the fact that a juristic person has been unlawfully deprived of its property and the 
prejudice to members and creditors203 • Even where there has been unanimous 
consent by all the shareholders, the creditors still remain and the issue of fraud on the 
creditors is relevant. Beuthin submits that "1here would be no less justification for 
conviction even if the accused was able to show that the company in fact had no 
creditors; for so long as a company is in existence it has potential creditors, and 
while there are potential creditors, there is potential prejudice" 204 
Where the abstractions by the corporate controller are minor, the solvency of the 
company will not be endangered. Here there would be no question of a fraud on the 
creditors. Where there are substantial or numerous abstractions of company 
property, the solvency of the company may be jeopardised and the complaint of the 
creditors of the company is simple - there is not enough money to pay them and the 
actions of the controllers have diverted funds from the company. There has been 
a failure of the controls on the decision makers. Possible insolvency of the company 
renders the shareholders disinterested as shareholders in the remnants of the 
company assets. Controlling shareholders or directors see no benefit in preserving 
202G Williams op cit note 198 at 923. 
2031n R v Herholdt 1957 (3) SA 236 (A) 261, Fagan C J stated: 
"[T]he people they wronged by the acts on which their convictions are based were the 
minority shareholders ... and the creditors·. 
204R C Beuthin op cit note 146 at 486. 
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the remaining funds of the company for the creditors, therefore they will seek to benefrt 
themselves further from the remains of the corporate funds, that is, at the expense of 
those creditors. Where the management of the company and its control by the 
shareholders are well separated, the shareholders will be checked from taking 
corporate assets by the management, and management checked by the shareholders. 
Where there is an absolutely controlled company, or a majority controlled company 
where the management and control is not well separated, the risks to creditors 
increase 205 , and the issue of. whether directors owe a duty to corporate creditors 
becomes material. 
The traditional view in South African company law is that there is no direct fiduciary 
relationship between directors and creditors 200• Directors primarily stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with their companies and therefore must act bona fide and in the 
best interests of their companies. Traditionally it was accepted that creditors should 
protect their interests by bargaining with the company 207 in respect of the amount 
of interest charged for the service they renderoe. There are also various statutory 
provisions tendentious of the fair treatment of creditors where a company is being 
205See D A Wishart "Models and Theories of Directors' Duties to Creditors• (1991) 14 New Zealand University 
LR 323, as well as 0 J S Fourie "Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers• (1992) 4 SA Mere L J 
25. 
200Muttinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] 2 AllER 
563 (CA) 585 g; 0 J S Fourie op cit note 205. 
207L S Sealy "Directors' 'Wider Responsibilities- Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural" (1987) 13 
Monash University L R 164, 176. 
208Built into the interest fee is compensation for the risk of loss they bear. The greater the risk of loss, the more 
is charged to compensate for that risk. Creditors cannot complain that it is the insolvency of the debtor company 
which has caused them loss because they have contracted to bear that risk and have built compensation for beating 
it into the cost of credit. Creditors assess the risk according to their expectations as to the behaviour of the 
company's controllers. It is when controllers act outside these expectations that the cr.editors are bearing 
uncompensated risks. See D A Wishart op cit note 205 at 335. 
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wound up209 • 
In certain other jurisdictions there has been a tentative cognisance of the creditors as 
a distinct group. Stemming from Walker v Wimborne and others 210, the locus 
classicus of the interests of creditors211 , the courts in Australia 212, New Zealand 213 
and England 214 have widened the dictum of Mason J in Walker so that it can now 
be said that in those. Commonwealth jurisdictions directors have a general duty 
towards present and Mure creditors, to take their interests. into account in 
circumstances where the debtor company is insolvent, potentially insolvent or of 
doubtful solvency 215• 
Developing a formalised recognition of a duty towards creditors to take their interests 
209C A Riley "Directors' Duties and the Interests of Creditors· (1989) 10 Co Law 87; N Hawke ·creditors' Interests 
in Solvent and Insolvent Companies" (1989) Journal of Business law 54, 56-57 and 59. 
210(1976) SOALJR 446; (1976) 137 ClR 1. This decision of the High Court of Australia has been followed and 
clarified in various other decisions. 
211
cf Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services ltd supra note 
206. 
212Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 548 548; Re 67 Budd Street <PM ltd; The Commonwealth v O'Reilly (1984) 
2 AClC 190 197; Hurley v BGH Nominees (Pty) ltd (No 21 (1984) 2 AClC 497; Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410; 
Kinsela v Russell Kinseta {Ptyl ltd (in liql (1986) 10 ACLR 395; Jeffree v National Companies and Securities 
Commission (1989) 15 ACLR 217, 7 ACLC 556. 
213Re Day-Nite Carriers Ltd fin liq) (1975) 1 NZLR 172; Re Avon Chambers ltd (1978) 2 NZlR 638; Nicholson 
v Permakraft (NZ)ltd (1985) 1 NZLR 242. 
21
"winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co ltd and Others [1986]1 WLR 1512 [1987] 1 AllER 114; West 
Mercia Safety Wear (in Jig) v Dodd [1988] BClC 250; Brady and Another v Brady and Another [1989] 1 AC 755, 
[1988] 2 AllER 617. 
2150 J S Fourie op cit note 206 28. 36. It should be noted that the recognition of fiduciary duties between 
directors and creditors is rejected in some circles. See l S Sealy "Directors' Duties • An Unnecessary Gloss• ( 1988) 
Cambridge L J 175 at 177; l S Sealy op cit note 207 176 et seq, 186 and 187-88. 
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into account encompasses problems and unanswered questions 216• In New 
Zealand, the Law Commission released a report 217 consciously attempting to codify 
the directors duties and advocating a radical solution to the problem 218• The New 
Zealand Companies Bill although seeming to subvert the intentions of the Law 
'· 
Commission at both the conceptual and practical levels 219 stresses that directors will 
possibly be statutorily empowered to weigh up the interests of creditors together with 
those of the members of the company and that creditors will have locus standi to sue 
for breaches of the law as well as the company constitution 220• The position in 
Australia was covered in the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs endorsing the continuing regulation of the area by equitable 
fiduciary duties developed in the case law and implicitly accepting the current trends 
in that Ia~, . ·, The Australian Law Reform Commission recommends yet another 
scheme, a new duty on directors to refrain from insolvent trading222 • 
In the South African law there has thus far been no elucidation of any general duty on 
21~he uncertainty relates to : to whom the duty is owed; the nature, content and duration of the duty; the 
juridical grounds underlying such a duty; remedies whereby creditors can enforce the duty, as well as the problem 
of ratification by the shareholders. See Fourie op cit note 206 at 37-44. 
217Law Commission Report No 9 Company Law Reform and Restatement(1989). 
218Paras 214 • 222 stated that the contractual status of creditors should be emphasised, their only shield being 
a duty owed by management to the company to maintain solvency and standing to sue for breach of the company 
constitution or the Act. 
219See D A Wishart "Models and Theories of Directors' Duties to Creditors• 1991 {14) New Zealand University 
LR 323 at 324. 
2200 J S Fourie op cit note 206 at 44 • 46. 
221 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Company Directors' Duties (AGPS, Canberra, 
1989) paras 5.58, 5.61 • 5.62. D A Wishart op cit note 219 at 324. 
222Law Reform Commission Report No 45, General Insolvency Inquiry (AGPS, Canberra, 1988) Ch 7. D A 
Wishart op cit note 219 at 325. 
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directors to take into account the interests of creditors223 • Although there has been 
recognition that the interests of creditors are of paramount importance where the 
company is insolvent, 22<4 the recent Appellate Division case of Ex Parte De Villiers 
and Another N N 0: In re Carbon Developments 225 may have put a damper on the 
expectation of a judicial pronouncement regarding a general duty towards creditors. 
Assuming that the company was liable to be wound up, the court had to decide 
whether its directors were acting unlawfully in allowing it to do business and to incur 
credit. Goldstone J A held that : 226 
• ..• [ijhe mere carrying on of business by its directors and incurring credit does not 
constitute an implied representation to those with whom they do business that the 
assets of t_heir company exoeed its liabilities : the implied representation is no more 
than that the company will be able to pay its debts when they fall due ..... 
The fact that the liabilities of a company exceed its assets does not necessarily 
mean that the incurring of further debts would constitute fraudulent or reckless 
conduct.· 227 
223H S Cilliers op cit note 59 at 156-7. 0 J S Fourie op cit note 206 at 47. 
22~he Appellate Division recognised in an obiter dictum in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ud 1969 
(3) SA 629 (A) where Trollip J A said at 662 : 
"[In a take-over case where the transferor company is solvent] the court has regard 
only to the interests of the shareholders. Here because of the insolvency of 
Saaiplaas, the paramount consideration must be the rights, wishes and interests of 
the creditors and not of the shareholders." 
2251993 (1) S A 493 (A). 
226 At 504 E - F. Corbett C J, Van Heerden JA. Nicholas A J A and Harms A J A concurring. · 
227The court approved and applied the dictum in R v Latib 1973 (3) SA 982 (A) at 984 G- H as well as the 
statement by Buckley J in an unreported judgment quoted in Palmer's Company Law 24th ed at 1463: 
"In my judgment, there is nothing wrong in the fact that directors incur credit at a time 
when, to their knowledge, the company is not able to meet all its liabilities as they fall 
due. What is manifestly wrong is if directors allow a company to incur credit at a time 
when the business is being carried on in such circumstances that it is clear that the 
company will never be able to satisfy its creditors. However, there is nothing to say that 
directors who genuinely believe that the clouds will roll away and the sunshine of 
prosperity will shine upon them again and disperse the fog of their depression are not 
entitled to incur credit to help them to get over the bad time•. 
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Before the insolvency stage, it is clear that the courts are, with the exception of an 
application made under section 424 of the Acf28 , powerless to give help to 
creditors229 • 
When a creditor is aware that a company, that is trading in insolvent circumstances 
and continuing to obtain further goods and services on credit, both the company and 
the directors could be .charged with the common law crime of fraud230 • 
SECTION 424 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 
To supplement a creditors common law remedies, the legislature introduced section 
424(1) of the Act, which has been described as being "surely one of the most powerful 
instruments in the hands of creditors,· 231 as well as being "an important and 
powerful weapon in combatting or at least detering, the abuse of limited liability as a 
vehicle of fraud." 232 Section 424(1) provides : 
"Where it appears, whether in the winding up or judicial management of a company, 
or otherwise, that any business of the company concerned was or is being carried 
on recklessly or with the intent to defraud creditors of the company or any other 
person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the court may, on application, declare that 
any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in such 
228Discussed below. 
2290 J S Fourie op cit note 206 at 48. 
230Ex Parte lebowa Development Corporation ltd 1989 (3) S A 71 (T) at 106 G - I. See also H S Cilliers QQ 
cit note 59 at 523; s 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Directors can also be held personally liable : 
Orkin Bros ltd v Bell 1921 TPD 92. 
231J J D.u Plessis Maatskappvregtelike Grondslae van die Regsposisie van Direkteure en Besturende Direkteure 
(unpublished LLD thesis, University of the Orange Free State 1990) 126. 
232F HI Cassim "Fraudulent or 'Reckless' Trading and Section 424 of the Companies Act" (1981)98 .sAW. 162 
at 163. 
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a manner be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any 
of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the court may direct. • 
Section 424(3) states that every person who was knowingly a party to the conduct of 
the company's business in the manner set out in subsection (1) commits an offence, 
apart from any other criminal liability he has incurred233 • The application of the 
section is not excluded because such person may otherwise be criminally liable in 
respect of the matters on the ground of which the declaration under subsection 1 is 
made234 • 
The ambit of section 424(1) is undoubtedly broad, conferring a wide discretion on the 
court to proviqe a meaningful remedy. Having regard to its object, namely to render 
' 
liable persons who in effect have managed or are managing the business of the 
company recklessly or fraudulently, even if the company is not in the process of being 
wound up, its language should be given its full breadth 235• 
Where an absolute controller has appropriated funds from the company, this civil 
remedy could be brought in conjunction with a charge of theft. In this context, in 
terms of subsection (1), a creditor could obtain an order declaring a director personally 
liable for some or all of the debts or liabilities of the company where the director was 
knowingly a party to the reckless or fraudulent carrying on of the business. Much 
233M Havenga "Creditors, Directors and Personal Uability under Section 424 of the Companies Act" (1992) 4 
S A Mere LJ 62 at 65. See also F H I Cassim idem. 
~he delinquent may be criminally liable example for common law fraud or for an offence under s 249 (1 ), 
250 (1) or 251 (1) or for an offence under s 425 read with the Insolvency Act. In the laying of any charge regard 
must however be had to the provisions of s 336 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. SeeP M Meskin (editor) 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4 ed (1985) 750. (hereafter Henochsberg). 
235Gordon v Standard Merchant Bank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 519 (C) at 527. 
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uncertainty relates to the degree of fault required to constitute reckless or intent to 
defraud in the section. In Ex Parte Lebowa Developments Corporation Ltd 236 , 
Stegmann J discussed the intention to defraud 237 and distinguished dolus directus 
and dolus eventual is. Intention to defraud takes the form of dolus directus "when the 
person making the misrepresentation is proved to be aware of its falsity and to intend 
that the .. representee should be deceived and should act on the induced 
misapprehension"238 • On the other hand, the form of dolus eventualis is assumed 
"when one person makes a misrepresentation of fact to another whilst not knowing 
whether his representation is true or false, if the representor· knows that his 
representation may be false and reconciles himself to the risk entailed in suggesting 
it to be true, to the potential or actual prejudice of that other or of anyone else.· 239 
Intention in the form of dolus eventualis is sufficient to constitute fraud2.co • 
Recklessness corresponds with the concept of dolus eventualis241 • Stegmann J 
indicated in Lebowa that in the context of fraud, the term "recklessly" is used in its 
narrow sense, and that the subjective state of mind of the representor needs to be · 
considered. 
2361989 (3) SA 72 (T). 
237The locus classicus in respect of fraudulent intent is the English decision of Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337, 
where Lord Herschel! said : 
"[F]raud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) 
knowingly or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be 
true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think 
the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under 
such circumstances can have no real belief in its truth." (at 374). 
2380p cit note 236 at 101 D - E. 
2381dem at 101 E- F. 
240S M Luiz and K EVan der Linde. "Trading in Insolvent Circumstan~s - Its Relevance to Sections 311 and 
424 of the Companies Act" (1993) 5 SA Mere L J 230 at 236. 
241 Reckless is the third instance mentioned in Derry v Peek (supra note 237) SeeS M Luiz and K EVan der 
Linde idem at 234. 
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The term "recklessly" in the context of section 424 is used to refer to a serious 
departure from the objective standard of care expected from a reasonable man242• 
Being an objective test and not subjective, it suffices that the offence was committed 
"by reason of the appellants blind faith in his own ability to pull the company straight. • 243 
"The criteria will be in the scope of operations of the company ... the role, functions 
and powers of the director, the amount of the debt, the extent of the company's 
financial difficulties and the prospects, if any, of recovery and many other factors 
particular to the claim involved and the extent to which the director has departed from 
the standards of a reasonable man in regard thereto. No attempt at a closer 
definition of gross negligence is feasible or advisable. • 244 In this broader sense, 
the term "recklessly" is used in contradistinction to "intent to defraud"245 • Carrying 
on any business of the company recklessly means carrying it on by conduct which 
evinces a lack of genuine concern for its prosperitf48 , as recklessness connotes at 
least gross negligence2~7 • 
There is some controversy as to the matter of whether a single transaction, for 
example one massive fraud committed by the director can attract liability under the 
2428 M Luiz and K E Van der Linde idem at 234. 
243Per Fagan J inS v Goertz 1980 (1) SA 269 (C) at 274 C. 
244M argo J in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another: Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v A W J Investments fPM Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 156 r:N) at 170. 
245Lebowa supra note 236 at 111 C - D; Ozinsky N 0 v Lloyd and Others 1992 (3) S A 396 (C) at 413 A. 
248Anderson v Dickson 1985 (1) SA 93 (N) at 110. InS v Harper 1981 (2) SA 638 (D) at 681 Milne J (as he 
then was) noted that conduct which constitutes a carrying on of the company's business with intent to defraud would 
almost invariably be reckless conduct where for any reason the intent to defraud is absent. 
247 See op cit note 244 at 170 D. In S v Parsons 1980 (2) S A 379 (D) the court held that the word 'knowingly' 
means 'with knowledge of the facts'. The word 'recklessly' applies to gross negligence without conscious disregard 
of the consequences. 
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section. In Gordon v Standard Merchant Ban~ , De Kock J pointed out that the 
question is not whether the transaction constituted the carrying on of a business, the 
question is whether, having regard to the transaction, any business of the company 
was carried on, or is being carried on in any of the manners envisaged by section 
424(1). Thus the misappropriation of company funds by a corporate controller, even 
if it amounted to one single transaction, would be covered by the section. 
The enquiry in terms of the section is whether the delinquent was knowingly a party 
to the carrying on of the business, and therefore one who knew that the business was 
being carried on in any of the ways envisaged by the section, and either actively 
participated in, or merely acquiesced in that happening was knowingly a party thereto, 
within the meaning of subsection (1 )249 • The remedy is available in circumstances 
"other• than where the company is in the process of being wound up or under judicial 
management. The exact meaning of this is not clear, but it seems that it would 
certainly protect creditors adequately against the misuse or abuse of their powers by 
corporate controllers250 • The intention of this section is not that the delinquent 
should be responsible to the company, so that payment by him would be to the 
company for the benefit of the creditors generally. Rather, the intention is that he is 
to be responsible for (himself obliged to pay) the debt or debts to which the 
declaration pertains and the court may make whatever direction it thinks proper for the 
purpose of giving effect to its declaration. An application under section 424(1) may 
be made by the Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, or any creditor, member 
2491984 (2) SA 519 (C) at 524- 525, 528. 
249Henochsberg op cit note 234 at 7 48. 
250M Havenga op cit note 233 at 68. 
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or contributory of the compan~1 • 
The declaration of the court may be made in relation to any debt or other liability (that 
is in addition to the debt or other liability) owed to the victim of the fraud or the 
recklessness. Thus the declaration may be made in relation to all the debts or other 
liabilities of the company, or made even where the company is able to pay its debts, 
in which case the declaration would have the effect, once obeyed, of benefiting the 
members. The court is also not limited to exercising its power only if the company 
has been or is being prejudiced. Henochsberg 252 points out that the court is able 
to penalise a delinquent whatever other consequences for the company, its members 
or its creditors his effecting payment pursuant to the declaration may have. In view 
of the above;·, Henochsberg submits that the purposes of section 424 are both 
compensatory and punitive. Despite the strong implications of the section, Luiz and 
Van der Unde 253 acknowledge that the application of the legal principles to the facts 
of particular cases is fraught with difficulties. 
In conclusion, where a director has abstracted large amounts of company property, 
even with the unanimous assent of the shareholders, the common law remedy of fraud 
on the creditors or the provisions of sections 424 and 219 254 provide sufficient relief 
in principle to protect the interests of creditors. It seems that a duty on directors, 
251Where creditdors of a close corporation have been prejudiced by the appropriation of corporation funds by 
the controllers, s 64 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 contains similar provisions regarding the dose 
corporation. See H S Cilliers, M L Benade, M J Oosthuizen, E M De Ia Rey Close Corporations : A Comprehensive 
Guide (1989) 51. 
2520p cit note 234 at 748. 
253Qp cit note 240 at 236. 
254Section 219 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provides for the disqualification of directors, officers and others 
by the Court. 
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similar to that in Australia, New Zealand and England, to take into account creditors 
interests during insolvent or potentially insolvent circumstarfces, is not necessary at 
this time in South Africa255• 
VI CONCLUSION 
Disregarding the legal technicalities of whether persons in working or absolute control 
of a company are capable in law of stealing from that company, it is necessary to 
consider whether such conduct ought to be termed as theft. That those who control 
a company (even if they constitute the totality of its shareholding) are capable in law 
of stealing from that company is cleafSS . A paradoxical situation arises when 
those accused of stealing from a company are its sole shareholders, since the 
property they\are charged with stealing, though not legally belonging to them, is 
vested in an entity which itself belongs to them.257 The essence of theft is that 
someone is wrongfully deprived of his property. In the case of an absolutely 
controlled company, the only persons who suffer loss in the event of an appropriation 
of the funds, are the company's creditors, including the Receiver of Revenue, who will 
be directly deprived of taxes due to him if the controller extracts company funds after 
they have been accounted for in the company's books and declared, or deprived of 
taxes even if the controller extracts the funds before they have been accounted for in 
the company's books. Although it is not suggested that the creditors have any 
proprietary interest which can be stolen, recent developments regarding the principle 
of fraud upon the creditors in England, Australia and New Zealand suggest that they, 
2550 J S Fourie op cit note 206 at 50. 
256S v De Jager supra note 2; Attomev=General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) supra note 23; R v Philipoou supra 
note 53. 
257J C Smith "Roffe! Case Comment" (1985) 9 Crim L J 320. 
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together with the company itself, might be properly regarded as victims of the offence. 
No wrong will be done to the shareholders because in an absolutely controlled 
company, the shareholders are also the alleged thieves. 
It may be asked whether a conviction on a charge of theft is the correct deterrent. 
From one perspective, the conviction of an absolute controller appears resolute. The 
punishment given by -!he court is essentially a discretionary matter, there being no 
standard sentences for theft charges. Although there is no mathematical relationship 
between the value of the property stolen and the punishment imposed, the court will 
take into account the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the subjective factors 
peculiar to the accused258 • Although in the case of an absolute controller 
appropriating ···company funds, the deterrent effect of a heavy sentence will be 
substantial, justice might be better served were the offender to lose his limited liability 
and make good his abstractions. From another perspective, there is no fundamental 
difference between a controller who breaks into the company's offices at night and 
steals from the company safe, and a controller who, by virtue of his control over the 
company, compels it to consent to its being despoiled. For the former offence a 
criminal conviction would be commonplace, therefore surely in the latter instance a 
conviction is also justified. 
his cake and eating it.· 258 
If not convicted! it would arnount to the controller "having 
Holmes J A [as he then was] in De Jager stated : 
•rhe appellants ccintention is an attempt to have it both ways. On the one hand he 
would retain the advantage of limited liability as a shareholder. On the other hand 
he would seek to absolve himself from the fiduciary duty which a director owes to 
258P M A Hunt op cit note 42 at 652. 
258G Virgo op cit note 25 at 486. 
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the company, helping himself to its assets via its supposed consent to which he was 
a party.... To combine in substance the common law advantages of individual 
ownership with the statutory benefits of limited liability without regard to fiduciary 
duties as a director - this would not be company law at all." 260 
Although a criminal conviction of theft coupled together with a declaration in terms of 
section 424(1} of the Act providing for the personal liability of the delinquent directors 
seems enviable, the effective application of civil law remedies and criminal sanctions 
to the transgessions of corporate controllers is likely to remain problematic. 261 
Corporate controllers may be involved in obvious thefts unattended by any evidential 
difficulties. These will normally occur in closely controlled companies and involve 
drawings from the company clearly unconnected with its authorised business 
\ 
objectives. On the other hand, provided the company is in a state of solvency, those 
at the heart of the company's affairs can reward themselves on a scale transcending 
liberality with considerable impunity2El2 . Schemes which in essence involve the 
abstraction of company money, may take on the guise of ordinary transactions. In 
certain instances, schemes which involve nothing more than the straightforward 
channeling of company money into the bank account of the controller may be 
obscured in evidential terms by a plethora of nominee companies involved in circular 
transactions263• 
260Supra note 2 at 625. 
261
"A powerful chairman and managing director, with a board of directors which is not able or willing to play 
an inquisitorial role into his transactions and expenditure, has immense scope for diverting company money to his 
own use over a long period of time• : Investigation into the Affairs of the Peachey Property Corporation Ltd, HMSO 
(1979}, para 227 from G A Sullivan "Company Controllers, Company Cheques and Theft" [1983] Crim LA 512 at 
522. 
262G A Sullivan idem at 522. 
263Look for example at the facts of Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991. 
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There is also another form of "disguised theft". If payments are claimed, for example, 
as directors' remuneration, despite the fact that remunerating directors is clearly a 
matter reasonably incidental to the running of a business, one could draw the 
conclusion that an appropriation of property belonging to another has occurred264• 
Excessively generous remuneration is prejudicial to the interests of minority 
shareholders (in majority controlled companies}, may be harmful to employees of the 
company, and also to creditors where the company is insolvent or in danger of 
becoming so. However, the courts will not usually interfere with the amount of 
remuneration to be paid to directors citing this as a matter of internal management. 
Therefore in most of the cases of dispute, the courts have evaluated the entitlement 
to the remuneration265 • The prime reason why the courts steer clear of the task 
of supervising .. the level of payments to directors is the absence of an objective means 
of measuring a directors worth to the company. With the exception of small 
companies, it is virtually impossible to calculate the value of directors' services. The 
varying talents of directors and the different demands made by their positions 
determine only a vague market value. What amounts to directors remuneration 
beyond their justifiable reward must be based on the standard of reasonableness. 
To come within ·reasonable remuneration", the amount awarded must be in proportion 
to the director's ability, services and time devoted to the company. Other relevant 
factors include the responsibilities assumed, difficulties involved, success achieved, 
2641n Re Halt Garage [1982) 3 AllER 1016 Oliver J ruled that the mere fact that "directors remuneration• was 
attached to the payments did not preclude a court from examining their true nature. If the payments were in 
substanq:~ gratuitous distributions out of capital and not a reward for serviq:15 rendered, they fell outside the scope 
of a provision empowering the payment of remuneration and were beyond ratification even by unanimous vote of 
the shareholders. 
~he reason for the paucity of reported decisions challenging directors' remuneration is not hard to find. 
Apparently the market for top executives is a highly specialised one and there is no ready yard-stick by which to 
measure the worth of an executive : Rogers v Hill 289 US 582 (1933). See generally Z Adenwala "Directors' 
Generous Remuneration :to be or not to be paid?" (1991) 3 Bond L R 25. 
corporation earnings, profits and prosperity211il . 
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These issues together with the 
courts long standing tendency to regard such matters as an internal concern of the 
shareholders, means that very few cases exist in which the courts have looked at the 
level of remuneration. In the absence of evidence of actual intention, it is therefore 
difficult to distinguish between remuneration which is merely generous, and payments 
which are of such an unreasonable amount, that they constitute a gift. Thus the 
remuneration of directors is a contentious issue, generally not determined in a manner 
which relates to effort and performance, and may amount to a •disguised theft•. 
******* 
\ 
In the final instance, it is necessary to answer directly the question as to whether, as 
a matter of law, absolute controllers should be convicted of the common law crime of 
theft. It is submitted that there are three different scenarios. w 
(1) Where a defendant has only majority or working control, regardless of the 
solvency of the company, where corporate property is abstracted, this is clearly 
theft. Victims would include creditors and minority shareholders and it would 
be relatively simple to show intent to steal in the form of dolus eventualis. 
(2) Where the defendant is an absolute controller of a company which has become 
insolvent as a direct or indirect result of his abstractions. Here clearly he 
should be convicted of theft. Most instances of theft by an absolute controller 
2e6z Adenwala idem at 30. 
267 G Virgo op cit note 25 at 488. 
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would fit into this category as large abstractions will often endanger the solvency 
of the company. In this regard, the cases of Raffel and Craig are, in the 
writer's submission, incorrect to the extent that they state that an absolute 
controller cannot be guilty of theff68 , and serve only to add fuel to the 
arguments of those persons critical of certain parts of the law in its treatment of . 
company directors:2Ei9. 
(3) The situation where the defendant is an absolute controller of a company which 
remains solvent despite his appropriations of company funds. Here the 
defendant probably could be convicted of theft. If the abstractions are small, 
they probably would not endanger the solvency of the company and prosecution 
would be unlikely because there is no obvious victim. Where the abstractions 
are large, a conviction of theft would be more likely· if it could be shown that 
capital has been abstracted. Where third parties have been affected by the 
abstraction and there is clear evidence of an intention to steal, in principle it is 
justified to convict. This would be a situation where both Moses and the man 
in the street 270 would support a conviction for theft. 
In answering the above question, one should assess whether it is expedient to draw a 
distinction between circumstances where the company is solvent or insolvent. The primary 
function of the criminal law is to deter undesirable condu~1 • The pillaging of companies 
2681dem. 
268R Baxt "Stealing from One's Own Company" (1993) 67 Australian L J 696 at 697. 
270Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1985) 41 SASR 147, 153 (Prior J). 
271
"Why are certain kinds of actions forbidden by law and so made crimes or offences? The answer is: to 
announce to society that these actions are not to be done, and to secure that fewer of them are done. • H LA Hart 
Punishment and Responsibility- Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1986) 6. 
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by those who control them is now all too common. 
In the final analysis, it is submitted that it would offend both common sense and justice to 
hold that the very control which enables such people to extract the company's assets 
constitutes a defence to a charge of theft from the company. In each case the question 
must be whether the abstraction of the property from the company was performed with the 
required intent, not whether tt:l_e alleged thief has consented to his own wrongdoing. Despite 
the impact of the appropriation of company funds on creditors, where an absolute controller 
steals from the company, he may think that "when it comes down to it, it's all up to us" 272 
within the corporation. This abuse of the corporate structure, making the separate 
personality of the company appear and disappear as would a genie, must be deterred, and 
where necessary punished. 
272A Ayckbourn A Small Family Business (1981), G Virgo op cit note 25 at 464, 489. 
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